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I.   INTRODUCTION
We claim for ourselves every single right that belongs to a freeborn Ameri-
can, political, civil and social; and until we get these rights we will never
cease to protest and to assail the ears of America. The battle we wage is not
for ourselves alone but for all true Americans. It is a fight for ideals, lest
this, our common fatherland, false to its founding, become in truth the land
of the thief and the home of the Slave—a by-word and a hissing among the
nations for its sounding pretensions and pitiful accomplishments.1
W.E.B. DuBois
Prevailing wisdom holds that substantial disparities exist in bar passage
rates between people of color2 and their white counterparts.3 Some scholars
argue that these differences reflect the educational preparation and academic
performance of racial groups prior to and during law school.4 However,
                                                                                                         
1. DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 330 (1993).
These lines were part of DuBois’ compelling “Address to the Country” read by Lafayette Her-
shaw at the Second Meeting of the Niagara Movement on August 15, 1906. Id. The address
ended with the reasoned demand: “Cannot the nation that has absorbed ten million foreigners
into its political life without catastrophe absorb ten million Negro Americans into that same
political life at less cost than their unjust and illegal exclusion will involve?” Id.
2. Any and all references in this Article to “people of color” or “minorities” is ex-
pressly intended to include Blacks or African-Americans, Latinos or Hispanic-Americans, and
Asians or Asian-Americans.
3. See Daniel O. Bernstine, Minority Law Students and the Bar Examination: Are Law
Schools Doing Enough?, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1989, at 10, 10. From confidential discussions
with several law school deans, Dean Bernstine recounts what he terms “unsubstantiated horror
stories” about the poor performance of minority students. Id. For example, he writes:
I have been able to determine that for some recent bar examinations, zero out of
eleven minority graduates of a particular law school passed the local bar . . . and at
yet another school, zero out of eight passed the local bar. The schools involved are
among the “better” law schools and, in fact, two of these three schools, in all likeli-
hood would, by consensus, be ranked in the top thirty of American law schools.
Id.; see generally STEPHEN P. KLEIN & ROGER BOLUS, COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, MINORITY GROUP PERFORMANCE ON THE CALIFORNIA BAR
EXAMINATION (1987); Katherine L. Vaughns, Towards Parity in Bar Passage Rates and Law
School Performance: Exploring the Sources of Disparities Between Racial and Ethnic Groups,
16 T. Marshall L. Rev. 425 (1991); Armundo M. Menocal, III, Letter from the Chair, B.
EXAMINER, Feb. 1991, at 2. Menocal writes:
Almost all examiners acknowledge that disproportionate pass rates exist. Too few,
however, actually know how great the gap is between men and women, minorities
and non-minorities, and other discreet [sic] groups. . . .
California keeps and publishes race, gender, and law school bar passage rates.
These confirm that major disparities exist. On a recent July examination, Anglo first
time bar-takers from ABA-approved law schools passed the California Bar examina-
tion at approximately eighty percent. For Asians, it was only sixty-five percent. La-
tinos . . . between fifty-five and sixty percent. The Black bar passage rate is at fifty
percent.
Menocal, supra, at 2-3.
4. See, e.g., Stephen P. Klein, On Testing: How To Respond to the Critics, B. EXAMINER,
Feb. 1986, at 16, 23 [hereinafter Klein, On Testing] (concluding that the bar exam is “neither
widening nor narrowing the gap among groups . . . [because a]nalyses of this issue show that the
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such disparate performance also generates concern that the bar examina-
tion, the gateway to the legal profession, may be infected with racial,
ethnic, cultural, gender, and/or economic bias unrelated to the competent
practice of law.5 To the extent that such bias prevents otherwise capable
law graduates from entering the legal profession, it is a serious problem.6
                                                                                                         
differences in performance level among racial/ethnic groups on this state’s bar exam parallel the
size of the differences among them in law school grades and admission test scores”). Klein states
that,
[i]n short, the bar exam neither widens or narrows the differences among groups that
were present before they took the exam.
Differences among racial groups on the bar exam also parallel differences among
them at other key points in the educational pipeline, such as graduation from high
school and college. The bar exam simply reflects an accumulated educational deficit.
It does not create or exacerbate it. Doing away with the exam would no more cure
this problem than would throwing away the scale change your weight.
Stephen P. Klein, Bar Examinations: Ignoring the Thermometer Does Not Change the Tem-
perature, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J., Oct. 1989, at 28, 30 [hereinafter Klein, Bar Examinations]
(citations omitted). See also Delgado v. McTighe, 522 F. Supp 886, 894 (E.D. Pa 1981)
(rejecting a claim of racial discrimination in the grading of bar examinations and quoting the
report of a defense expert witness: “ ‘The differences in the percentages failed will be elimi-
nated only when the blacks as a group . . . come to the examination as well prepared as are the
whites.’ ”) (citations omitted).
5. See generally Maurice Emsellem, Racial and Ethnic Barriers to the Legal Profession:
The Case Against the Bar Examination, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J., Apr. 1989, at 42; Henry Ramsey,
Jr., Symposium, National Conference on Minority Bar Passage: Bridging the Gap Between
Theory and Practice, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 419 (1991); Dannye Holley & Thomas
Kleven, Minorities and the Legal Profession: Current Platitudes, Current Barriers, 12 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (1987); Linda E. Dávila, The Underrepresentation of Hispanic Attor-
neys in Corporate Law Firms, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1987); Klein, On Testing, supra note
4; John Pierre et al., Racial Disparities in Bar Examination Performance: An Hypothesis, 40
LA. B.J. 483 (1993).
6. The consequences of discriminatory bar exams are extremely significant. See, e.g.,
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, PROPOSED STUDY OF THE BAR EXAMINATION (1991).
After noting the large numerical differences in passage rates, the authors concluded:
The societal impact of this discrepancy cannot be overstated. First, the dispropor-
tionate failure rate affects the hiring and retention of minority law graduates in all
areas of the profession. Second, these rates may substantially discourage minority
college graduates from seeking admission to law school, thus compounding the
problem of law-school recruitment as minority enrollment in college drops nation-
wide. Third, and perhaps most important, the level of minority representation in the
profession has a significant impact on public confidence in and respect toward the
justice system.
Id. at 1. See also THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON
ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY—A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 11 (1992) [hereinafter REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK]. While
reiterating the concerns reflected in the New York State Bar Association’s report, the authors
write that “because many minority lawyers serve the under-represented, legal services to the
poor have been especially hard-hit by the disparities in bar passage rates between whites and
minority groups.” Id. at 13.
The California Committee of Bar Examiners appointed a special multiracial subcommittee to
examine the disproportionality in the bar passage rates of minorities and whites. The sub-
committee concluded that “a substantial increase in the minority representation in the profes-
sion is one of the greatest challenges facing the legal profession in California and must be ad-
dressed by the profession as a whole as rapidly as possible.” MICHAEL R. YAMAKI ET AL.,
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The issue is not new. Bias in the examination process has been ob-
served in one form or another for over sixty years, but any serious effort
to recognize or correct this problem has been stymied by three interre-
lated factors.7 First, there is a scarcity of comprehensive, accurate statis-
tical data to confirm racial disparities in bar passage rates over time and
across jurisdictions. Second, courts consistently demonstrate an unwill-
ingness to consider judicial remedies as an appropriate response to any
aspect of the disparate bar passage problem. Lastly, there is a surprising
lack of thorough, sensitive analysis of the causes and the sources of such
racially disparate bar performance. This Article analyzes each of these
three interrelated factors.
                                                                                                         
COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, MINORITY PASSING
RATES ON THE BAR EXAMINATION 24 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Delgado, 522 F. Supp. at 886. In that case, the plaintiffs, three African-
Americans and two Hispanics, alleged that the Pennsylvania Board of Bar Examiners inten-
tionally manipulated the required passing score in order to discriminate against minorities. Id.
They also argued that
[t]he allegation that Blacks have been excluded by the Board from the practice of law
in Pennsylvania is not new. Frankly, some of the statistics are shocking. For the ten
year period from 1933 to 1943, no Black was admitted to the practice of law in
Pennsylvania. . . . [F]rom July 1950 to the end of 1952, thirty Black candidates from
Philadelphia County took a total of forty-three examinations, some individuals being
examined two or more times, and . . . only six of them passed.
Id. at 886-87. See also GERALDINE R. SEGAL, BLACKS IN THE LAW: PHILADELPHIA AND THE
NATION (1983). In discussing the nature of this problem, Segal cites a 1973 study by Lani
Guinier, a University of Pennsylvania Law School Professor at that time. The study, which
was conducted before indicia of color were eliminated from the records kept by state bar exam-
iners, documented the failure rates of black candidates as follows:
California
(no year given) 56% of blacks and Latins failed
24% of nonminorities failed
District of Columbia
June 1973 184 of 200 blacks failed (92%)
Georgia
1972 41 of 41 blacks failed (100%)
Illinois
August 1972 30 of 40 blacks failed (75%)
March 1973 12 of 16 blacks failed (75%)
Nebraska
June 1972 5 of 10 blacks failed (50%)
January 1973 1 of 9 blacks failed (11%)
Ohio
1973 11 of 29 blacks failed (38%)
Virginia
1970 24 of 30 blacks failed (80%)
Id. at 11.
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Part II examines the widespread practice of forbidding the collection of
hard data documenting the performance of bar candidates along racial or
ethnic lines in virtually every jurisdiction. In reviewing the history of this
practice, the Article identifies a correlation between the banning of such
data collection and the entry of large numbers of minorities into law
schools. The proffered rationale supporting this practice is reviewed, and
recommendations calling for its reversal are made.
Part III examines prior judicial challenges to the bar examination on
the basis of unlawful racial discrimination. This part reviews the various
constitutional and statutory bases which plaintiffs have utilized and sug-
gests that not only do courts almost universally reject racial discrimination
claims against state bar examiners, but they also appear hostile to such
actions. The Article explores possible sources and explanations for such
hostility and considers their implications.
Part IV confronts and dispels the myth that the bar examination serves
as a test to ensure the minimum competence of lawyers.
Part V reviews the major theories, as reflected in the few studies
which have been conducted in this area, and explains the causes and
sources of racially disparate bar performance. This part analyzes and cri-
tiques the prevailing rationale that racial differences in bar passage rates
derive from poor academic preparation and performance by minorities at
every significant stage along the educational pipeline. This part also con-
fronts the logical conclusion of this theory—that the only solutions to the
present problem are long-term and must occur long before minorities
come to the bar exam.
This part suggests that to solve the problem of racially disparate bar
passage rates, educators do not need to improve the quality of minority
candidates but rather to alter the procrustean, negatively reinforcing
pedagogical process to which those students are subjected before and es-
pecially during law school. In other words, to the extent that any fault can
be identified, it does not lie with minority candidates per se, but rather in
the educational process which produces them.
Finally, in part VI the Article concludes with a modest proposal for
process-based solutions to the bar passage problem, including both long-
and short-term applications. While these solutions are designed to be ap-
plied at every level of the educational system, their primary utilization
should be in the law school teaching and learning process.
Law school pedagogical paradigms have remained essentially un-
changed for over 100 years. Perhaps the greatest benefit of examining
whether bar examinations discriminate along racial, ethnic, and gender
lines would be the motivation for a long overdue reevaluation and re-
definition of what constitutes a competent attorney—a reconsideration ad-
dressing the issue of how best to produce such a person and, ultimately,
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how to test such a person’s competence without unreasonably sacrificing
fairness.
II.   THE ABSENCE OF DATA
A.   State Practices
With the single exception of the state of California, no state regularly
collects or maintains data on the race, ethnicity, or gender8 of its bar ex-
amination candidates.9 As a consequence, virtually no state can claim any
accurate knowledge “of the effect of [its] bar examination on minority
applicants.”10 What little information which does exist (outside of Cali-
fornia) is necessarily anecdotal and incomplete and, therefore, largely un-
reliable.11
                                                                                                         
8. From the limited information available, it also appears that the bar exam has a discrimi-
natory impact on women. Recent figures from Iowa indicated an 11% difference in the passage
rate between men and women in the June, 1987 administration of the Iowa Bar Examination, and
a 14% difference in the passage rate in the December, 1987 administration. REPORT ON AD-
MISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 13; see also Arthur E. Ryman Jr., Women
and the Bar Examination: Thinking like a Woman Lawyer, 37 DRAKE L. REV. 79 (1987-88). In-
terestingly, Ryman notes that the female graduates of Drake University Law School who failed the
Iowa Bar Exam on the subject dates had better academic records, on average, than their male
classmates who failed the exam. Ryman, supra, at 79; see also Stephen P. Klein, An Analysis of
the Relationships Between Bar Examination Scores and an Applicant’s Law School, Admissions
Test Scores, Grades, Sex, and Racial/Ethnic Group, B. EXAMINER 1980, at 14, 17. The author
notes that “[f]emale applicants did slightly less well on the MBE [multistate bar examination] por-
tion of the examination than would have been expected on the basis of their LGPAs [law school
grade point averages] and LSAT [Law School Admissions Test] scores. For example, 7% more
females than males passed the essay, but 5% more males than females passed the MBE.” Id. Al-
though Klein characterizes this difference as “slight,” it is important to note that the net effect re-
sulted in a 12% swing downward from the position in which the females should have been on the
basis of LGPAs, LSAT scores, and essay performance. See generally infra part IV.B.3.
9. Menocal, supra note 3, at 3; see also SEGAL, supra note 7, at 10-11 & n.41. Accord-
ing to Segal, the National Conference of Bar Examiners did not maintain any data on the race
of those candidates who either took or passed the various state bar examinations and was un-
able to refer Segal to any other sources that did. SEGAL, supra, at 10-11 & n.41; see also
REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 12 (“California is the only
state which regularly collects and analyzes data concerning the minority pass rate.”).
10. Menocal, supra note 3, at 3.
11. See generally Bernstine, supra note 3; MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON BAR ADMISSIONS, THE BAR EXAMINATION: IS IT FAIR? (1989) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS BAR REPORT]. The Committee concluded, after a frustrating and ultimately un-
successful effort to verify and quantify the nature of the bar passage problem among minorities,
that
[a]lthough we found very few answers or reasons for the low passage rate, and in
fact little concrete statistical evidence that a significant variance between majority
and minority exam takers exists, other than anecdotally, we nonetheless believe that
the questions raised herein and our recommendations are sound, and can serve as a
basis for further study and analysis. . . .
In spite of an exhaustive attempt to establish the actual pass/fail rate for minority
bar exam takers in Massachusetts, the Committee was unable to obtain data sufficient
to quantify the minority pass rate for any specific year. However, we have no reason
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Commentators have advanced three reasons to explain the failure of
state bar associations to collect a broader scope of data on applicants, in-
cluding their race, rather than merely collect data on which law school the
applicants attended.12 First, it has been suggested that “some jurisdictions
are unwilling to collect information on such a major, volatile, social issue
when they see no solution in sight.”13 This observation is particularly
troubling when one considers that the practice of barring disclosure or
collection of race information in state bar examinations begun in the early
1970s closely parallels the entry of significant numbers of minorities into
the nation’s law schools.
Second, out of an expressed concern for applicants’ privacy interests,
some states forbid the collection of racial and ethnic data on bar examina-
tion candidates.14 The validity of this justification weakens if one consid-
ers that racial and ethnic data are collected at virtually every other stage
of a student’s educational experience, from grade school through college
and graduate school admissions to employment applications.15 No such
privacy concerns have been seriously raised at any of these other levels,
either by those who seek such information or by those who supply it. In
fact, by the time minority candidates reach this stage in their educational
careers, they are quite accustomed to providing such information at the
threshold of every significant standardized examination. Consequently,
the failure to collect such data is likely to spark the interest of minority
applicants because noncollection is anomalous when compared to their
previous experience. The justification to protect privacy is paternalistic
and unwarranted, at best. More troubling is the possibility that noncollec-
tion is disingenuous as a pretext for more insidious goals. Privacy argu-
ments are probably advanced more to protect the interests of a board of
examiners than those of the minority test takers.
The third, and perhaps most popular, justification for the prohibition
against data collection is a desire to avoid even the appearance of impro-
                                                                                                         
to conclude that the minority pass rate is any better or worse here in Massachusetts
than any other state in the nation.
MASSACHUSETTS BAR REPORT, supra, at 6-8.
12. See also Menocal, supra note 3, at 3; Bernstine, supra note 3, at 10 (“[J]urisdictions
are careful to protect the confidentiality of a particular school’s bar passage rates and will, in
most instances, release data to a school about only its graduates.”).
The problem of data collection is further complicated by the fact that many juris-
dictions do not maintain any records of graduates by school. In those jurisdictions
which do maintain such records, however, the records are often kept only for
graduates of the schools in that particular jurisdiction or for schools which have a
substantial number of graduates taking that jurisdiction’s examination.
Bernstine, supra, at 15 n.1.
13. Menocal, supra note 3, at 3.
14. Id.
15. Id. (“[T]his kind of data collection is an accepted fact from law school admissions to
employment records.”).
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priety or discrimination.16 Some have suggested that if bar examiners
knew the race and ethnicity of each bar taker, somehow that information
would be intentionally and deliberately “misused to single out and fail the
minority applicant.”17
Avoiding the appearance of any impropriety is a worthy goal; how-
ever, evidence reveals that even this concern is misplaced. For example,
the state of California has collected, analyzed, and published data on the
races and ethnicities of its exam takers for more than twenty years. In that
time, there has been neither controversy nor the privacy violation pre-
dicted by those jurisdictions that prohibit the collection of such data.18 On
the contrary, as a consequence of this open information practice, Califor-
nia is at the forefront of confronting the problem of racially disparate bar
performance and serves as a model for the rest of the nation in this re-
gard.19
B.   State Studies
Although the problem of racially disparate bar performance has been
known for some time, relatively few states have studied the causes of this
disparity or acted to address it. Only California, New York, Florida,
Massachusetts, and Washington have undertaken any serious effort to
study the problem.20 While these states’ efforts have yielded varying re-
                                                                                                         
16. Id.; see also REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 11.
17. Menocal, supra note 3, at 3; see infra part III; see also Pierre et al., supra note 5, at
487. In attempting to discover the reason for the racially disparate bar performance of bar
candidates in Louisiana, the authors hypothesized that, given the essay format of Louisiana’s
Bar Exam, it might be possible “for the bar examiners unconsciously to pick up on the race of
the writer from their usage, syntax, grammar and word choice. And is it possible that these
examiners, again unconsciously, would allow their lower expectations of a particular writer to
influence their assessment” of the writer[’s] score?” Pierre et al., supra note 5, at 487
(citations omitted).
This theory is not so unreasonable as it may appear, given the results of a study conducted in
California. In that study, 80 elementary school teachers were given a series of eight essay ex-
ams to grade. Id. at 486. All of the exams had been previously determined by educational ex-
perts to be of equal quality—the only difference among the essays was the name assigned to
each one. Id. Some essays were given so called “red-blooded all-American” sounding names,
others were given wimpy or unpopular sounding names. Id. The teachers gave the papers sig-
nificantly different grades, with the red-blooded all-American names receiving the highest
grades, and the wimpy or unpopular sounding names receiving the lowest. Id. at 486-87. Such
studies and questions fuel suspicions that extraneous matter such as word choice, or even a
name, can significantly, albeit unconsciously, affect the substantive evaluation of quality.
18. See Menocal, supra note 3, at 3.
19. Id.
20. See generally KLEIN & BOLUS, supra note 3 (California); YAMAKI ET AL., supra note 6
(California); REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6; HARI SWA-
MINATHAN & H. JANE ROGERS, AN INVESTIGATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE
FLORIDA BAR EXAMINATION, FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS
STUDY COMMISSION OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT (1991); MASSACHUSETTS BAR REPORT,
supra note 11.
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sults, they have reached unanimous conclusions with respect to two key
points.
  First, all of the studies agree that state bar examinations appear to have
a discriminatory impact along racial, ethnic, and gender lines.21 Second, all
agree that the collection of racial data on bar takers appears to be essential.22
In fact, one study concluded that the “[c]ompilation of data regarding bar
passage rates of minority law graduates is a prerequisite to any conclusive
assessment of claims of racial bias of the bar examination . . . . [T]he
proper collection of such data and the preparation of statistics are essential
elements of any meaningful reform of the bar examination.”23 Clearly, no
one can meaningfully address the issues raised by racially disparate bar per-
formance without a base of hard empirical data regarding the races of those
who take the exam and their performances.
C.   Law School Admission Council Bar Study
Fortunately, the need for more information is beginning to be recognized
and addressed on a national scale. In 1991, the Law School Admission
Council (LSAC) began a national bar passage study “in an effort to obtain
complete and accurate information about bar passage rates among graduates
from ABA-approved law schools, as well as about factors that may influ-
ence performance in law school and success on the bar examination.”24 Con-
                                                                                                         
21. See, e.g., REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE NEW YORK BAR, supra note 6, at 12. The
Committee found that in New York State, the significance of the disproportionality between
whites and minorities was “sobering and should occasion much concern” and concluded that
“[t]he extant research in other jurisdictions indicates that the bar examinations in those states
have a discriminatory impact on minority applicants and may also discriminate against female
and older applicants.” Id. (citations omitted). See also SWAMINATHAN & ROGERS, supra note
20, at 28. In evaluating the essay portion of a number of prior administrations of the Florida
Bar Exam, the Commission concluded: “In the February administration, all essays showed
potential bias against minority candidates. The performance of the minority candidates was
substantially lower than the performance of the Whites. For the July administration, one of the
three essays showed potential bias against the minority candidates." Id.
22. See REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 14. This
study emphasized that
[s]uch data collection is a necessary antecedent to the identification of any defects in the
content, design, and/or administration of the bar examination. The goals of data collec-
tion are to identify any components of the testing process which are unrelated to the
practice of law and which have a disproportionate adverse impact upon minority appli-
cants.
Id.
23. Id. at 11; see also SWAMINATHAN & ROGERS, supra note 20, at 30. The report rec-
ommended that “[t]he Florida Board of Bar Examiners obtain racial/ethnic information on
candidates for the Bar Exam so that performance levels of majority and minority candidates
can be monitored.” SWAMINATHAN & ROGERS, supra note 20, at 30.
24. Henry Ramsey Jr., Law Graduates, Law Schools and Bar Passage Rates, B.
EXAMINER, Feb. 1991, at 21, 21. Therein Dean Ramsey notes that on the basis of the LSAC
study,
[f]or the first time, an accurate determination of the bar passage rate among various dis-
crete groups; e.g., men and women, minorities, graduates of large and small law schools,
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cerned about the legal profession’s comparatively few minority members,25
many major national legal organizations have endorsed this laudable ef-
fort.26 Despite the good faith efforts of many, there has not been any sig-
nificant change in the numbers of minority lawyers since Secretary of La-
bor Willard Wirtz more than thirty years ago described  “the legal pro-
fession as the worst segregated group in the whole economy.”27
The LSAC bar passage study is an excellent first step in identifying
whether there are components of the bar examination “which are unre-
lated to the practice of law and which have a disproportionate adverse im-
pact upon minority applicants.”28
 However, the value of the LSAC study is limited for a variety of rea-
sons. The study is a single study covering only three classes of graduates
from ABA-approved law schools during the years 1988, 1989, and 1991.29
Moreover, the race, ethnicity, and gender data of bar applicants in the
study will not be collected from the boards of bar examiners but rather
                                                                                                         
members of low and middle income families, graduates of private and public law schools,
and the like, can be achieved over several administrations of the bar examination and in all
states.
Id.
25. See, e.g., Anne R. Carey & Suzy Parker, Blacks in the Legal Profession, USA
TODAY, Feb. 20, 1995, at A1. In 1983, there were 651,000 lawyers and judges in America, of
whom 17,577, or 2.7%, were black. Id. Ten years later in 1993, there were 815,000 lawyers
and judges in America, of whom 22,820, or 2.8%, were black. Id. This represents an increase
of just 0.1% in 10 years!
The lack of any significant change in minority representation in the legal profession is high-
lighted by the statement of the great Charles Hamilton Houston, the first general counsel of what
later became the independent NAACP Legal Defense Fund: “According to the 1930 census there
were 1230 Negro lawyers in the United States in 1930 as against 159,735 white lawyers.” Charles
H. Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 49, 49 (1935). This means that
from 1934 to 1993, a period of almost 60 years, the percentage of black lawyers increased from
0.7% to 2.8%, or by only 2.1%. The lion’s share of this increase occurred during the period from
1970 to the present and was spurred in large part by the advent of affirmative action. See SEGAL,
supra note 7, at 5-9. The dismantling of affirmative action, a current popular political goal, por-
tends a deceleration of the meager gains in representative proportions which black lawyers have
achieved.
26. The Bar Passage Rates study
has been endorsed by the Conference of Chief Justices, National Conference of Bar
Examiners, American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to
the Bar, National Asian Pacific American Bar Association, and the Council on Legal
Education Opportunity. [Moreover b]oards of law examiners in Alabama, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North
Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin have already agreed to fully cooperate with the
study.
Ramsey, supra note 24, at 21-22.
27. SEGAL, supra note 7, at 24 (citations omitted); see, e.g., William L. Martin, The
Women and Minorities Study: The Results Are In, ARKANSAS LAWYER, Apr. 1992, at 51, 51
(observing, from his study results, that “[e]ighty percent of the white attorneys work in segre-
gated offices”). Thus, as of 1992, 80% of white lawyers in Arkansas worked in offices that
had no minority attorneys at all. Martin, supra, at 51.
28. REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 14.
29. Ramsey, supra note 24, at 21.
1996]                    BAR PASSAGE RATES 731
will be obtained directly either from the law students themselves or from
the participating law schools.30
For these reasons, this study does not address the real need for bar
performance data. An effective determination of the impact of race, eth-
nicity, and gender on bar examination performance requires a systematic
and continuous collection of such data across administrations and juris-
dictions.31
 Moreover, the task of collecting such data should be the responsibility
of each state’s board of bar examiners, not the LSAC. The former are
charged by their respective state legislatures with preparing, monitoring,
and administering a fair and impartial examination and, at the very least,
should be routinely required to provide some modest amount of statistical
evidence to prove that they are acting impartially and lawfully. Ideally,
bar examiners’ efforts in this regard should occasionally be subject to in-
dependent audits evaluating their performance. However, it should not be
left to an outside agency to compile the data essential to judge the per-
formance of the various state boards of bar examiners.32 This is true because,
                                                                                                         
30. Id. at 23. Although well-intentioned and an extremely valuable contribution to the extant
knowledge in this area, the LSAC study, even when completed, will be of limited value. This is
because its statistical base consists of only three classes of graduates and thereby is limited in
terms of the range of its informational base. Id. This is true even though the retrospective module
will focus on the graduates of the classes of 1988 and 1989, while the prospective module will fo-
cus on those students who entered law school in the fall of 1991 and thus were members of the
graduating class of 1994. Id. This limited statistical base is further exacerbated by the fact that the
study will terminate with the class of 1994 and, at least presently, there are no plans to continue
monitoring future classes in order to measure the effect of reforms currently being discussed by
members of the bench, bar, and academia. Id. By its own terms, the study is designed to provide
information to “assist students, educators, bar examiners and administrators, and others to better
understand the national bar passage situation, and, as a result, to develop methods for increasing
the success rates of students—particularly minority students—in law school and on the bar exami-
nation.” Id. The study will clearly make a significant contribution to the information available to
all of these identified groups, but without further and continuous monitoring, there is no way to
determine whether the anticipated new “methods for increasing the success rates of students—
particularly minority students—in law school and on the bar examination” will bear any tangible
fruit in terms of increases in law school performance or bar exam passage rates. Id.
31. See REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 14. The
authors conclude:
Collection of such data on a long-term, continuous basis is absolutely crucial to the
process of evaluation and reform of the examination and the admissions process.
Only by collecting such data across administrations of the examination can the im-
pact of reform upon minority pass rates be monitored, and further reform effected.
That an inadequate examination should prevent the entry of capable minority stu-
dents into a profession which desperately needs their talents—and that the Board of
Law Examiners has failed to compile the information necessary to confront these
problems effectively—impresses this Committee as a shortcoming of significant pro-
portions.
Id. at 14-15.
32. Currently most states do not collect data on the race or ethnicity of their bar exam
applicants. See Menocal, supra note 3, at 3 (“[T]he overwhelming majority of all states have
avoided the collection of race-ethnic data. Frankly, some jurisdictions are unwilling to collect
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as a matter of simple efficiency, the boards of bar examiners are in the
best position to acquire and maintain data on the race, gender, and eth-
nicity of their bar applicants and their exam results. It seems quite illogi-
cal to ask such boards not to discriminate among its bar applicants on the
basis of race, gender, and ethnicity but then to fail to require them to ob-
tain and maintain sufficient data to determine whether they are fulfilling
that mandate.
A revealing analogy can be found in the area of racially discriminatory
lending practices by banks. Racial discrimination in lending is explicitly
prohibited by federal law.33 Moreover, in order to monitor the financial
industry’s compliance with these statutory mandates, lenders must collect,
maintain, and disclose the number of mortgage applications they receive
and their lending decisions with respect to each one, on the basis of the
census tract, income, race, and sex of the applicant.34
On the basis of the data which the law requires lenders to collect and
maintain on the race and results of mortgage applicants, startling empiri-
cal findings showed that blacks with the same income as whites were
                                                                                                         
[such] information.”); see also REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note
6, at 11; MASSACHUSETTS BAR REPORT, supra note 11, at 7-8.
Regarding failure of the New York State Board of Law Examiners to collect racial or ethnic
data on its bar applicants, the authors of the New York Bar report observed, “The Law Exam-
iners, however, to avoid the appearance of discrimination, have purposefully refused to com-
pile these statistics.” REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 11.
In the Massachusetts report, the authors noted that they had been unable to quantify the exact
number of minority applicants who took and failed the Massachusetts Bar Exam because “[t]he
Committee discovered . . . that the bar examiners do not collect information as to race or eth-
nic background. . . . The law schools were reluctant to provide any information because of
privacy concerns for the graduates.” MASSACHUSETTS BAR REPORT, supra note 11, at 7-8.
33. There are three principal federal statutes in this area:
(1) The Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of
residential housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or na-
tional origin).
(2) The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 (1974) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1994)).  Although this Act was originally passed to
address the problem of discriminatory lending against women, it was expanded in 1976 also to
prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin. See Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, Sec. 32, 90 Stat. 251 (1976)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994)).
(3) The Community Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1994) (requiring regulated federal institutions to serve the conven-
ience and needs of their communities for deposit and credit; inter alia, regulated institutions
must meet the statute’s standards in order to receive permission to buy another bank or to open
an additional branch facility).
34. See Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1125 (1975) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§
2809-10 (1994)); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, Sec. 1211, 103 Stat. 183, 524-26 (1989) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (1994)).
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more than twice as likely to be denied approval for home mortgages.35
Similarly, a now famous study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Boston revealed that, even after correcting for all relevant differences
among applicants, blacks were still turned down almost sixty percent
more often than similarly situated qualified whites.36
This empirical evidence of such stark racial disparities in mortgage
lending has led many to view the numbers as evidence of clearly illegal
racial discrimination by banks.37 Others disagree regarding the meaning
and significance of the numbers.38 However, it is clear that the entire cur-
rent debate over the possibility of lending discrimination would be signifi-
cantly less focused without the supporting data that lenders were required
to collect, maintain, and disclose in order to monitor their compliance
with the federal mandate not to discriminate.
That statutory scheme appreciated that the lenders themselves are in
the best position to collect and disclose the data on their mortgage appli-
cants. Moreover, without such comprehensive and continuous collection
of information, it would be impossible to determine whether the banks are
in fact discriminating along racial lines. Similarly, the various boards of
bar examiners are in the best position to collect and disclose the data on
their bar exam applicants; without such comprehensive and continuous
collection of information, any effort to determine definitively whether the
boards are discriminating along racial, ethnic, or gender lines will be
significantly and unnecessarily burdened.
                                                                                                         
35. See Glenn B. Canner & Delores S. Smith, Expanded HMDA Data on Residential
Lending: One Year Later, 78 FED. RESERVE BULL. 801 (1992).
36. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING
THE HMDA DATA 2 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992).
37. See, e.g., Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empow-
erment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice,
107 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1994); see also Peter P. Swire, The Persistent Problem of Lending
Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995). Although he
acknowledges that he shares the economists’ view that government regulation of lending dis-
crimination is unnecessary because the market will deter, correct, and punish lenders who vol-
untarily forego profits or income in order to indulge their prejudices, Swire does observe that
“[t]he Boston Fed Study, based on by far the best data yet available, was hailed by true believ-
ers and others as definite proof of continuing discrimination in mortgage lending.” Swire, su-
pra, at 808 & n.120 (citing Paul Wiseman, Bankers Grumpy Despite Strong Profits, USA
TODAY, Oct. 19., 1992, at B6) (quoting Federal Reserve Governor John LaWare, who stated
that the study provided “conclusive evidence of de facto discrimination”).
38. See, e.g., Swire, supra note 37, at 798 (citing Gary S. Becker, The Evidence Against
Banks Doesn’t Prove Bias, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 19, 1993, at 18; Stan Liebowitz, A Study That
Deserves No Credit, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 1, 1993, at A14).
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III.   JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE BAR EXAMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
UNLAWFUL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
A.   The Judicial Record
It is well-settled that states have a legitimate interest in regulating the
admission of attorneys to their respective bars by imposing a standard of
licensing that ensures competence and thus protects the public.39 As the
United States Supreme Court noted in the oft-cited case of Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners:40
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral
character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the
bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the
applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice law. . . . Even in applying
permissible standards, officers of a State cannot exclude an applicant
when there is no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these stan-
dards or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.41
1.   Tyler v. Vickery
Tyler v. Vickery42 is one of the earliest, and most frequently cited, ju-
dicial challenges to the bar examination. Tyler involved a consolidation of
a number of suits into a class action “on behalf of all black persons who
have taken and failed the Georgia Bar Examination and have not been
admitted to the practice of law in Georgia, as well as all black persons
who will take the examination in the future . . . .”43 The plaintiffs claimed
that the Georgia Bar Examination violated the United States Constitution
on both due process and equal protection grounds.44
 The plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges fell into three categories.
They alleged that 1) the Georgia Bar Examiners used the Bar Examination
to discriminate purposefully against black applicants on the basis of race;
2) the Georgia Bar Examination inherently violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment due to the highly disparate passage
                                                                                                         
39. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); see also In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975);
Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975).
40. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
41. Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
42. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976). Cases which fol-
lowed Tyler include Jones v. Board of Comm’rs of the Ala. State Bar, 737 F.2d 996 (11th Cir.
1984); Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979); Parrish v.
Board of Comm’rs of the Ala. State Bar, 533 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1976); Delgado v. McTighe,
522 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Newsome v. Dominique, 455 F. Supp. 1373 (E.D. Mo.
1978); Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282 (D.Md. 1977).
43. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1092.
44. Id.
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rates of blacks and whites; and 3) the Georgia Bar Examiners violated the
applicants’ due process rights by not providing a procedure for review of
failing grades.45 The federal district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners on all three of the plaintiffs’
claims.46 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
grant.47 However, in a separate opinion, Judge Adams provided a spirited,
eloquent, and well-reasoned dissent.48
The uncontroverted facts in Tyler demonstrated that, for a number of
years, black bar applicants had failed the Georgia Bar Examination in
significantly disproportionate numbers to their white counterparts.49 As
even the circuit court majority conceded, disproportionality “reached a
nadir in July, 1972, when each of the 40 black applicants taking the ex-
amination failed. On the February and July, 1973, examinations, slightly
more than one-half of the black applicants were unsuccessful, as com-
pared to a failure rate of roughly one-fourth to one-third among white ex-
aminees.”50
Notwithstanding these strikingly disparate bar results, the court held
that the appellants had failed to establish the requisite showing of inten-
tional discrimination by the Georgia Bar Examiners.51 In so holding, the
court reasoned that a mere showing of a discriminatory motive, even if
proven, did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.52 Rather, in
order to prove such a violation, the appellants needed to show such mo-
tives coupled with the opportunity to manifest such motives in discrimina-
tory conduct.53 In short, the Bar Examiners had to be able to identify a
particular test as having been authored by a black applicant in order to
discriminate intentionally against him.
                                                                                                         
45. Id. at 1093.
46. Id. at 1092.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1105 (Adams, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1092.
50. Id. It is interesting to note that, although it was not pointed out by the court in Tyler,
“even blacks graduating from top-ranking ‘Ivy League’ law schools did not fare well.” SEGAL,
supra note 7, at 11.
All of the white Yale law school graduates who took the Georgia test passed, but
the two black Yale graduates failed. All of the white Harvard law school graduates
passed and the one black Harvard person failed.
All of the white Columbia law students passed and the three black graduates from
Columbia failed.
Id. at 11-12 (citation omitted).
Therefore, even those black applicants who had high LSAT scores and LGPAs, as evidenced
by their admission to and graduation from a range of Ivy League law schools, and who pre-
sumably had received relatively good educational preparation and experience, uniformly failed
that administration of the Georgia Bar Examination.
51. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1093.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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The appellants had advanced a novel theory to explain how the exam-
iners could make such a racial identification. They argued that the Bar
Examiners could identify black applicants in the grading process by virtue
of their use of a Southern patois that they referred to as “Black Eng-
lish.”54 However, the court rejected this theory on two grounds. First, the
plaintiffs’ own expert acknowledged that this dialect was not limited to
blacks but was, in fact, characteristic of the Southern dialect generally.55
Second, the plaintiffs’ expert acknowledged that it was quite unlikely that
anyone not trained in linguistics would “recognize the use of Black Eng-
lish as a ‘black’ characteristic, or indeed as anything other than incorrect
standard English.”56
The court also relied on the grading procedure of the Georgia Board of
Bar Examiners to decide that the opportunity for racial discrimination was
absent. The Board presented evidence that all examination papers were
identified and graded anonymously. Throughout the grading process, the
identification cards that contained the applicants’ names were in the cus-
tody of an employee of the Georgia Supreme Court who served as an
administrative assistant to the Board.57 That custodial official, by deposi-
tion, swore that examinations were matched with their corresponding
identification cards only after the exams were given their final grades.58
The Fifth Circuit accepted these representations as accurate and held that
since the examiners could not discover the race of an applicant, the dis-
trict court’s grant of summary judgment for the Bar Examiners on the ap-
pellants’ intentional discrimination claim was correct as a matter of law.59
The appellants’ second constitutional claim alleged that, notwithstand-
ing intent, the Georgia Bar Exam inherently denied them equal protection
under the law by disproportionately failing black applicants.60 As support
for this conclusion, the appellants urged the court to apply by analogy the
                                                                                                         
54. Id. at 1094. In support of this theory, the plaintiffs introduced the deposition testi-
mony of a professional linguist, who held a Ph.D. in the field and had spoken and published
widely about Black English, including its history and usage in America. Id. The linguist indi-
cated that there was such an English variant, distinct and identifiable, and that under extreme
stress, such as a bar exam, an individual who had been raised in this dialect might well revert
to it notwithstanding years of formal training in standard English. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The black appellants argued that, notwithstanding this acknowledgment by their
own expert, the use of Black English in a bar examination essay response could still be the ba-
sis for overt discrimination because even if the grader did not recognize it as a racial character-
istic, he would still react “negatively because he conceives it to be incorrect.” Id. Recent
studies provide support for the appellants’ arguments. See discussion supra note 17.
57. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1093.
58. Id. at 1093 n.1.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1095.
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previously-operative standards developed by the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission for employment testing under Title VII.61
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.62 that Title VII prohibited the use of any testing process or procedure,
regardless of intent or motive, that disproportionately excluded members
of a protected minority unless such tests were “demonstrably a reasonable
measure of job performance.”63 The circuit court in Tyler agreed with the
appellants that the Georgia Bar Exam violated the first prong of the
Griggs Court’s interpretation of Title VII because the exam had a dispro-
portionate, adverse impact on black applicants.64 The court agreed that the
Bar Exam also violated the second prong because the examination had
never been the subject of a professional validation study.65
After concluding its Title VII comparison, the circuit court recognized
that “acceptance of appellants’ suggested standard of review would inexo-
rably compel the conclusion that the examination is unconstitutional,”66
but it then avoided this result by holding that Title VII did not apply “by
its terms.”67 To support this conclusion, the court rejected appellants’ ar-
guments that the Bar Examination was an employment test68 and found
that the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners was “neither an ‘employer,’ an
‘employment agency,’ nor a ‘labor organization’.”69
The Tyler Court took pains to explain that, although the Georgia Bar
Exam had not been professionally validated as Title VII required and al-
though no alternative means of measuring professional competence had
                                                                                                         
61. Id.; see Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1996). As construed by the then-operative, but now-overturned, case of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., Title VII prohibited the use of any testing process or procedures, regardless of in-
tent or motive, that had the effect of disproportionately excluding members of a protected mi-
nority class of persons, unless such tests were “demonstrably a reasonable measure of job per-
formance.” 401 U.S. 424, 425 (1971). Under the EEOC guidelines interpreting Title VII,
which were in place at the time:
The use of any test which adversely affects hiring, promotion, transfer or any other
employment or membership opportunity of classes protected by Title VII constitutes
discrimination unless: (a) the test has been validated and evidences a high degree of
utility as hereinafter described, and (b) the person giving . . . the particular test can
demonstrate that alternative suitable hiring, transfer or promotion procedures are un-
available for his use.
29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1974).
62. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
63. Id. at 425.




68. Id. The appellants actually posited that the Bar Examination was a type of super-
employment test, in that failure resulted not simply in the loss of a specific job, transfer, or
promotion, but rather in the inability to practice law anywhere in the entire state. Id. Nonethe-
less, the court was not persuaded. Id.
69. Id.
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been considered, the conclusion did not necessarily follow that “the ‘job-
relatedness’ of an examination has no relevance to its constitutionality.”70
However, the court ultimately decided that it was inappropriate to equate
Title VII protections with Fourteenth Amendment equal protection re-
quirements.71 The court based its decision, in part, on a reading of the
case law.72
The majority also rejected the appellants’ alternative strict scrutiny
standard of review. The appellants contended that the significant disparity
in bar passage rates between blacks and whites created a classification
based on race, for which strict scrutiny review was constitutionally man-
dated.73 In rejecting the appellants’ theory, the court noted that the clear
weight of authority held that “an otherwise legitimate classification does
not become . . . ‘suspect’ simply because greater numbers of a racial mi-
nority fall in the group disadvantaged by the classification.”74
However, the court noted that its conclusion did not mean that “any
facially neutral method of classification automatically escapes more than
minimal judicial scrutiny.”75 Rather, the court presented examples of
situations in which a facially neutral classification might trigger a higher
standard of review, including 1) when such a classification is “merely a
subterfuge for invidious discrimination,”76 2) when such a classification is
“discriminatorily applied,”77 or 3) when “statistical evidence of disparate
racial impact alone may establish a prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion.”78 The court held that none of these classifications were applicable to
the instant case.79
                                                                                                         
70. See id. at 1099. The court went on to observe, “The hallmark of a rational classifica-
tion is not merely that it differentiates, but that it does so on a basis having a fair and substan-
tial relationship to the purposes of the classification.” Id.
71. Id. at 1098. In fact, the court referred to its holding in this regard as “our refusal to
measure the constitutionality of the Georgia Bar Examination by Title VII standards.” Id. at
1098-99.
72. See, e.g., Allen v. City of Mobile, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 909 (1973); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Communications Workers of Am.
v. AT&T, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 737 (1976);
Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev’d, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
73. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1099.
74. Id. (citing Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137 (1971); comparing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)).
75. Id. at 1100.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court noted that when this showing has been met, it shifts the burden of proof
to the defendant to demonstrate that, in fact, “invidious discrimination was not among the rea-
sons for his actions.” Id. However, the court concluded that it did not have to decide whether
this standard applied in the instant case because of its conclusion that the appellee-examiners
had carried their burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact re-
garding intentional racial discrimination. Id.
79. Id.
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The court then applied the rational relationship test to find the Georgia
Bar Examination constitutional.80 In reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that an examination should meet two criteria to be rationally sup-
portable: it should “be designed for the purpose for which it is being
used,” and it should “utilize a cutoff score related to the quality the ex-
amination purports to measure.”81
The Tyler court held that the Georgia Bar Examination satisfied both
prongs of this two-part rationality test.82 The examination satisfied the
first prong because both the essay and the multistate portions of the exam
were “designed solely to assess the legal competence of bar examinees.”83
The examination satisfied the second standard because, “while the mini-
mum passing score of 70 has no significance standing alone, it represents
the examiners’ considered judgments as to ‘minimal competence required
to practice law’. . . .”84 The court reasoned that because the operative
standard of review was one of rational relationship rather than strict scru-
tiny, the state was not required to show that it had no other less restrictive
means of testing applicants but was required to show only that the means
it did employ were reasonable.85
Finally, the appellants argued that they were denied due process of law
by the Bar Examiners’ failure to provide a procedure for review of a
failing exam should an examinee request it.86 The appeals court agreed
with the district court’s holding that such a review process was not consti-
tutionally required because the failed examinee had the absolute and un-
limited right to take the examination again at its next administration.87
Further, the court found that the administrative burdens of a review out-
weighed any possible benefits.88 In the court’s view, the requested reviews
would be time-consuming, expensive, and burdensome to the Bar Exam-
                                                                                                         
80. Id. at 1101.
81. Id. at 1101-02 (citing Armstead v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 461 F.2d 276
(5th Cir. 1972)) (holding that the Graduate Record Examination was an unconstitutional
method for selecting primary and secondary school teachers since it failed to meet the standard
of a rationally supportable examination established therein).
82. Id. at 1102.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. The court also rejected appellants’ argument that the Board of Examiners should
be required to use model answers and predetermined standards in grading, since these were
merely suggestions for improvement and did not go to the question of whether the examination
was reasonable. Id. Similarly, the court rejected appellants’ arguments that the Board of Exam-
iners was acting unreasonably in at least two other respects: 1) because its practice of deter-
mining which failing exams were to be reviewed and regraded was based not on a definitive
numerical cutoff, but rather on the exercise of an examiner’s own discretion, and 2) because it
employed the practice of comparing examination results with the law school records of the ex-
aminees. Id. at 1103.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1103-04.
740 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:721
iners and unlikely to be “significantly more effective in exposing grading
errors than would reexamination.”89 
The decision in Tyler is interesting and illustrative. Notwithstanding
the length and detail of the opinion, the majority’s decision appears hos-
tile in its tone towards the appellants’ claims. For example, the court de-
scribed the appellants’ arguments as “speculative inferences,”90 which are
not to be “treated indulgently”;91 they were “overly simplistic,”92 “naked
statistical argument[s],”93 which are “specious,”94 “devoid of merit,”95
and “beyond question”96—all descriptions making it seem perfectly rea-
sonable that the court should “flatly reject [the] appellants’ contentions.”97
Furthermore, the court used all of this language in the context of affirm-
ing the district court’s granting of summary judgment against the appel-
lants on issues involving motive and intent—a context in which the ma-
jority acknowledged that the Supreme Court had admonished that “
‘summary procedures should be used sparingly.’ ”98 The Tyler dissent
drove home this point: “[W]here one of the key factors in determining il-
legality will be the evaluation of motive, it seems particularly inappropri-
ate to employ the device of summary judgment.”99
Because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Bar Examiners, the appellants never had an opportunity to prove their
case at trial. As Judge Adams emphasized in his dissent in Tyler, “[T]he
majority decision rests upon a tenuous resolution of pivotal factual issues
in a troublesome area of the law where residual doubts . . . should be re-
solved in favor of the plaintiffs.”100 On the issue of purposeful discrimi-
nation, the dissent agreed with the majority that where the state is admin-
istering a policy which is neutral on its face, unequal application in and of
                                                                                                         
89. Id. at 1104. The court noted in this regard that, even if it were to make the “generous
assumption that one out of every hundred applicants who take the examination fail[s] when
they should have passed due to arbitrary grading, the probability that the same individual
would be the victim of error after two reexaminations is literally one in a million.” Id. (citation
omitted). The court was also impressed with the fact that the hearing process itself could be
susceptible to error. See id. Accordingly, on balance they saw little advantage to providing
such a review and certainly no constitutional error in not providing one. See id. at 1104-05.
90. Id. at 1095.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1097.
93. Id. at 1099 (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 1101.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1102 (quoting an unreported opinion of the court granting summary judgment in
one of the consolidated actions comprising the appeal at issue).
97. Id. at 1103.
98. Id. at 1093 (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473
(1962)).
99. Id. at 1108. Interestingly, the dissent also cited Poller, as had the majority, to support
this proposition.
100. Id. at 1105.
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itself is not a violation of the equal protection guarantee.101 However, the
dissent did observe that such purposeful discrimination “may be evi-
denced by a systematic, long-continued pattern of unequal results.”102
The dissent suggested that insidious forces were at work beneath the
face of the court’s decision.103 Judge Adams observed that in this case, a
clear, historical pattern of racial disparity in the bar passage rate did ex-
ist. For the years at issue in the case, 1972 and 1973, 100% of the black
applicants who took the Bar Exam failed the first administration.104 In the
face of this evidence, Judge Adams concluded:
A colorable case of purposeful racial discrimination is set forth
where sustained de facto discrimination is shown together with the ab-
sence of an investigation, or indeed any effort, by the administrators of
the state program in question to ascertain whether the seemingly pur-
poseful discrimination is intentional in fact or is explainable by the cir-
cumstances. This is so because a presumption of racial inferiority is
simply not permissible.105
The dissent quite correctly observed that, given Georgia’s poor history
of race relations, it was extremely curious that when faced with a 100
percent failure rate of black applicants, six of whom had been graduated
from the top law schools in America, the state made no effort to inquire
whether the Bar Examiners had unlawfully discriminated against these
applicants.106 It is difficult to understand why a 100% bar failure rate for
the state’s black bar applicants did not lead to some sort of inquiry by the
state’s Board of Bar Examiners. Such dismal unanimity would seem to
suggest that something is terribly wrong somewhere. It therefore follows
logically that, on at least some level, the Georgia State Bar Examiners
were not alarmed by such results and did not find them sufficiently at
odds with their expectations for the intellectual performance of their black
applicants to warrant either investigation or inquiry.107 As the dissent ob-
                                                                                                         
101. Id. at 1106.
102. Id.
103. See infra note 108 regarding the impermissibility of presumptions of racial inferiority.
104. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1105. This applicant pool consisted, in part, of at least six blacks
who were recent graduates of three of the finest law schools is the country, and yet each of
them failed this Bar Examination. See supra note 50.
105. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1106 (citations omitted).
106. Id. There is no record of either an official inquiry or investigation by the Georgia
State Board of Bar Examiners as a consequence of this 100% bar failure rate of all 40 black
applicants. This is particularly striking in light of the fact that among that group were six black
applicants who had been graduated from Harvard, Yale, and Columbia law schools. See
SEGAL, supra note 7, at 11-12. The dissent noted, in this regard, that there was “the absence
of an investigation, or indeed any effort, by the administrators of the state program in question
to ascertain whether the seemingly purposeful discrimination is intentional in fact or is explain-
able by the circumstances.” Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1106.
107. Perhaps there are more benign explanations for the Board of Bar Examiners’ nonre-
action to such unanimous failure, but I am at a loss to think of one. As the dissent in Tyler
pointed out, there was, and to a large extent still is today, a widespread presumption, particu-
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served, this attitude was grounded in the presumption of the inferiority of
blacks as a race, an attitude beyond the pale of acceptable state action.108
The dissent argued its position “based in large measure on the nature of
the uncontradicted facts which plaintiffs have advanced to establish a case
of racial discrimination violative of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.”109
In response to the majority’s finding that the Bar Examiners would
have difficulty identifying applicants by race, the dissent insightfully ob-
served, “[T]he difficulty of proof does not eliminate its possibility. Surely
such difficulty, without more, should not bar, in the context of this case,
affording the plaintiffs the opportunity of offering any such evidence at
trial.”110
The majority seemed too quick to believe the evidence presented by
the Board of Bar Examiners. In finding no genuine issue of material fact
on the issue of intentional discrimination, the majority relied solely on the
deposition of the custodian of the identification records, who stated that
detailed procedures were in place to ensure the anonymity of the appli-
cants.111 Notwithstanding the official written procedures, it is certainly
possible that the custodian did not follow those procedures. Cross-
examination could have uncovered such information at trial. Yet a trial on
the merits was foreclosed by the grant, and subsequent affirmance, of
summary judgment in favor of the Bar Examiners.
 The majority’s presumption of credibility is also evident in its appli-
cation of the rational relationship test. In Armstead v. Starkville Municipal
Separate School District,112 the Fifth Circuit had developed a two-part test
for determining whether an examination was rational.113 The second prong
required that the examination “utilize a cutoff score related to the quality
                                                                                                         
larly in states such as Georgia, of the intellectual inferiority of blacks as a race. This presump-
tion strikes me as the most, in fact the only, logical explanation for the Board’s apparently
passive reaction to such stark bar results. Although private individuals are free to harbor such
racist presumptions about the intellectual capacity of an entire race of people, such an attitude
is absolutely unacceptable as a basis for either state action or inaction. Again, as the dissent in
Tyler pointed out, with respect to state action, “a presumption of racial inferiority is simply not
permissible.” Id.
108. Id. Such presumptions have been a part of our common American heritage since be-
fore the founding of the Republic and continue to haunt us to this day. See infra part V.B.
109. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1105.
110. Id. at 1106.
111. Id. at 1093. The Board of Bar Examiners thus denied both that there was any actual
racial animus and that, even if there were, there was no opportunity to act upon it since the ex-
aminers could not discover an applicant’s race before grading his or her exam. Id.
112. 461 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the Graduate Record Examination was an
unconstitutional method for selecting primary and secondary school teachers).
113. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1102. The test suggested that a rationally supportable examination
should meet two standards: 1) be designed for the purpose for which it is being used, and 2)
utilize a cutoff score related to the quality which the examination purports to measure. Id.
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the examination purports to measure.”114 The only evidence that the
Georgia Bar Exam satisfied this standard was the court’s unsubstantiated
conclusion that the cutoff score “represents the examiners’ considered
judgments as to ‘minimal competence required to practice law’.”115 Judge
Adams, in dissent, made clear the oddity of the majority’s holding when
he wrote:
[T]he selection of cut-off scores, especially when such selection is not
subject to review, may be arbitrary. The legality of such decisions may
not properly be resolved by mere reference to the good faith judgment
of the bar examiners.116
Similarly, the majority’s refusal to apply strict scrutiny review in this
case was suspect in light of the court’s decision just three years earlier in
Baker v. Columbus Municipal Separate School District.117 As the dissent
pointed out, this same court had held in Baker that “ ‘[w]henever the ef-
fect of a law or policy (use by school district of a 1,000 cut-off score in
the National Teachers Examination as a condition of employment) pro-
duces . . . a (significant) racial distortion it is subject to strict scrutiny.’ ”118
Curiously, in attempting to distinguish Baker, the majority argued that the
holding therein had been based on “an explicit finding of purposeful racial
discrimination.”119 Yet, in this case, by affirming the grant of summary
judgment below, the court foreclosed the appellants from any opportunity
to establish such similarly purposeful racial discrimination and justifiably
to invoke strict scrutiny analysis at trial.120
                                                                                                         
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1106. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Adams observed in a footnote that he
did not mean “by this statement to impugn the integrity of the examiners. Rather, [he] sug-
gest[ed] only that it is not appropriate to foreclose an attempt by plaintiffs to establish this
fact.” Id. at 1106 n.7.
117. 462 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1973).
118. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1106 (quoting Baker, 462 F.2d at 1114); see generally Beverly
M.M. Charles, First They Came for the Teachers . . . : Competency Testing and the Decertifi-
cation of Texas Teachers Issued Certificates Valid for Life, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1
(1986). But see Michael Rebell, Disparate Impact of Teacher Competency Testing on Minori-
ties: Don’t Blame the Test-Takers—or the Tests, 4 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (1986).
119. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1102 n.11. As a consequence of this finding, the court had held
that the appropriate standard of judicial review was one of strict scrutiny (requiring a compel-
ling state interest) rather than merely of rational relationship. Id.
120. Of course, the majority found that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the
issue of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 1093. However, in so doing, it relied unreasonably
and without further explanation on the good faith word of the Bar Examiners themselves and
their agents, without giving the appellants an opportunity to test such testimony and the
credibility of the witnesses on cross-examination before a jury. See supra notes 57-59 and ac-
companying text.
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2.   Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama State Bar
Ironically, a short time after deciding Tyler, the Fifth Circuit reviewed
the grant of summary judgment in a similar claim of intentional discrimi-
nation, this time brought by a class of black plaintiffs against the Alabama
State Bar Examiners. In Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of the Alabama
State Bar,121 a class of black bar applicants appealed a grant of summary
judgment. At the lower level, the black bar applicants had challenged the
constitutionality of the Alabama Bar Examination on two grounds: (1) that
the Bar Examiners intentionally discriminated against black applicants by
identifying their supposedly anonymous exams and “grading them lower
than white applicants who displayed equal proficiency,”122 and (2) that the
examination was invalid under Title VII standards because it was not
“sufficiently ‘job-related’ ”123 and “fail[ed] blacks in disproportionately
high numbers compared to whites.”124 In support of this latter claim, the
appellants had presented uncontroverted evidence to the district court that
over the last ten administrations of the Bar Examination “the passing rate
for blacks had been 32% while it had been 70% for whites.”125
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that summary judgment had been
granted despite the fact that they had not yet completed discovery of
documents that contained facts essential to opposing the defendants’ mo-
tion for summary judgment.126 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought copies of
all answer sheets for the February, 1973 Bar Exam in order to demon-
strate that “substantially identical answers were graded discriminatorily
on the basis of race.”127 The Bar Examiners claimed that these documents
were neither relevant nor material to the allegations in the complaint and
refused to produce them.128 Relying on its recent Tyler holding, the circuit
court held that the trial court should have required production of the ex-
amination documents requested by the plaintiffs.129 The court reasoned
                                                                                                         
121. 533 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1976).
122. Id. at 944.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. In addition, the plaintiffs presented evidence that notwithstanding the fact that
blacks comprised over 25 percent of the population in Alabama, the number of black lawyers
constituted less than 1% of the state population. Id. The plaintiffs argued that this disparity was
caused, in part, by the discriminatory and unconstitutional Bar Exam. Id.
126. Id. at 947.
127. Id.
128. Id. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the production of those documents. How-
ever, without ruling on that motion, the trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the
Bar Examiners. The court found no material issue of fact and held that “ ‘under the circum-
stances . . . the disparity in percentage of failures among blacks as compared to whites has li t-
tle weight and fails to make out a prima facie case sufficient to realign the burden of proof so
as to require the Defendants to establish that the exams are not discriminatory.’ ” Id. at 945
(quoting the district court).
129. Id. at 948.
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that its finding in Tyler was premised, in part, on the fact that the plain-
tiffs had been provided with all of the examination papers, though they
had still failed to establish any connection between race and examination
results. According to the court, the plaintiffs in this case “lacked ‘the
means’ (access to the examination papers) and thus were not saddled with
‘the duty’ to bring the pertinent facts forward”130 to show a connection
between race and examination results.
 However, in sharp contrast to its reasoning in Tyler, the Parrish court
held that “we are compelled to recognize that a plaintiff has a right to
challenge the sworn affidavits used to support a motion for summary
judgment by discovery in order to meet such a motion just as he is enti-
tled to challenge sworn testimony on a trial.”131
The plaintiffs in Tyler were not afforded such an opportunity to chal-
lenge the sworn affidavits of the Bar Examiners and their agents. Rather,
the Tyler court accepted the Bar Examiners’ representations as truthful,
based solely on the court’s belief in the affiants’ good faith.
The Parrish plaintiffs’ allegations of intentional discrimination were
leveled at Bar Examiners who expressly required that each examination
applicant provide a photograph with his or her application.132 In this con-
text, contrary to Tyler, the court stated that “the fact that the defendants
required a clearly racially identifiable application form to be filed for the
taking of examinations without question put it within the power of the de-
fendants to utilize racial identification as an ingredient in the grading of
the examination papers.”133
Although the circuit court noted that the state had a compelling interest
in identifying its attorneys once they had been admitted to practice, it re-
jected this justification for requiring a photograph prior to admission.134
Undisputed testimony revealed that the photographs were, in fact, never
used for the purpose of verifying the identity of persons who actually sat
for the Bar Examination.135 Thus, the court found that Alabama’s re-
                                                                                                         
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 949. The Bar Examiners defending this practice claimed that it was crucial to
the compelling state interest in identifying attorneys and discouraging persons other than the
actual applicants from sitting for the examination. Id. (citing the district court opinion).
133. Id. (citation omitted).
134. Id. at 949-50.
135. Id. at 950. “At the April 20 hearing, the appellee secretary of the Alabama Bar As-
sociation stipulated that ‘there is no effort by affiant to match the photographs of applicants
with the persons actually appearing for the bar examinations, and affiant knows of no one else
who attempts to make such a match up.’ ” Id. at 950 n.8.
Clearly, this admission suggests that the proffered justification for requiring photographs—of
deterring impostors from sitting for the Bar Examination—was, at best, disingenuous, and, at
worst, a pretext for purposeful discrimination. The court found that such a practice
“[o]bviously . . . makes it easier for those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.”
Id. (citing Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)); see, e.g., Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S 559 (1953) (involving a jury selection process that identified white jurors on white tickets
746 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:721
quirement of a photograph with each Bar Examination application created
an “opportunity for discrimination, which if coupled with statistics show-
ing a prima facie case of racial discrimination as was present in the jury
selection cases, would deny appellants equal protection of the law.”136
In Parrish, the plaintiffs also argued that statistical evidence showing
substantial differences between the bar passage rates of blacks and
whites137 amounted to a constitutional deprivation by requiring blacks to
pass a bar examination that had not been validated “in the sense that this
term is used under Title VII of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act.”138 The plaintiffs cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.139 in support of their argument.140 However, between the
original disposition of Parrish at the trial level and its later consideration
on appeal by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, that same court had just
recently decided the case of Tyler v. Vickery.141 In Tyler, the plaintiffs
made the same test validation argument that was presented in Parrish and
the appellate court rejected it by concluding that the act did not apply to
the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners because the scope of the statute was
expressly limited to employers,  employment agencies, and labor un-
ions,142 and the Board satisfied none of those jurisdictional categories.
Relying on its decision in Tyler, the Parrish court rejected the plain-
tiffs’ test validation argument by simply noting that, since it had recently
held that Title VII did not apply to the Georgia State Bar Examiners be-
cause they were not an employer, they saw no basis for “distinguishing
that case from the Alabama case now before us.”143 However, the court
did nevertheless reverse and remand the case back to the trial court—but
only on the limited issue of allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to com-
                                                                                                         
and black jurors on yellow tickets); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967) (involving a jury
selection process that designated blacks with an identifying code letter after their names); An-
derson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (involving a voting practice that racially identified a
black candidate on the voting slate in the voting booth); Jones v. Smith, 420 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.
1969) (involving a jury selection process based on tax records that used different color forms
for blacks and whites).
136. Parrish, 533 F.2d at 950.
137. Id. at 944 (“Statistics produced during the litigation showed, for example, that in the
last ten bar examinations the passing rate for blacks had been 32% while it had been 70% for
whites.”).
138. Id. at 949.
139. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
140. In Griggs, the Supreme Court had held that Title VII precluded the use, in the context
of employment decisions, of tests or testing procedures that disproportionately excluded mi-
norities, without regard to intent, absent a demonstration that such tests had been validated as
demonstrating “a reasonable measure of job performance.” Id. at 436.
141. 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975).
142. Id. at 1096 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)).
143. Parrish, 533 F.2d at 949.
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plete discovery of relevant documents before the trial court could properly
consider the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.144
3.   Richardson v. McFadden
The Fourth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the South Caro-
lina Bar Examination in Richardson v. McFadden,145 a case in which four
black applicants who had failed the exam brought suit against the state
Bar Examiners on due process and equal protection grounds. The essence
of the plaintiffs’ claims in the lower court was that “other applicants at
other times appeared to have received more favorable treatment in grad-
ing than that which was afforded them.”146
This case was an en banc reconsideration by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals of its prior review of the district court’s denial of relief to the
plaintiff group. The prior panel affirmed the district court’s denial of re-
lief to the plaintiff group except for the individual claims of two mem-
bers, Spain and Kelly. Regarding Spain and Kelly, the Fourth Circuit had
previously held that the “Law Examiners had acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously, and it directed the district court to order them to be certified as
having passed the South Carolina Bar.”147 As a threshold matter in its re-
consideration, the court noted that its function was not to determine
whether the Bar Examiners had made a mistake in individual cases but,
rather, to ascertain “if there [had] been a denial of due process or of equal
protection . . . [since n]ot every erroneous determination mounts up to a
denial of due process or equal protection.”148 The court then found that
the appellants Spain and Kelly were not entitled to individual relief.149
                                                                                                         
144. Id. at 950. The documents in question consisted of the examination papers and grad-
ers’ notes, which the plaintiffs wanted in order to see whether the papers of black and white
exam takers with similar answers had, in fact, been graded differently. Id. at 947. Although
the plaintiffs had moved to compel the production of these documents, the Board resisted and
the court entered summary judgment in favor of the Board without ever ruling on the plaintiffs’
motion. Thus the court held that it was necessary to remand on at least this issue “in order to
permit the plaintiffs to complete their discovery as to matters on which the trial court had not
acted prior to its final judgment.” Id. at 948.
145. 563 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978).
146. Id. at 1131. Specifically, the evidence showed that plaintiff Spain, a June, 1971 appli-
cant, had an average score of 70.5 and was failed by three examiners. Id. However, applicant
number 129, a white June, 1970 applicant, received a score of 71.8 and was failed by three
examiners but was then passed by the Board and admitted to practice. Id. Similarly, plaintiff
Kelly, a February, 1971 applicant, received an average score of 69.6 and was failed by three
examiners. Id. However, applicant number 10, a white February, 1971 applicant, received a
score of 69.3 and was failed by two examiners but was then passed by the Board and admitted
to practice. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976), overruled as stated in Nichols v.
City of Jackson, 848 F. Supp. 718 (S.D. Miss. 1994)).
149. Id. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit was concerned about whether the district court
had even possessed the required subject matter jurisdiction to review the denial of admission of
an individual to the state bar. Id. However, the majority of the court found it unnecessary to
748 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:721
In rejecting their claims, the court found that “of the aggregate 828
examinations given during the eight times that the bar examination was
administered over a four-year period, only these two [plaintiffs’] exam-
ples of alleged discrimination were proved.”150 On this record, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish “the constitutional dis-
crimination requisite to the granting of individual relief.”151 Having de-
termined that there had been no constitutionally protected denial of due
process or equal protection, the court of appeals held that Spain and Kelly
were not entitled to individual relief.
4.   Pettit v. Gingerich
In Pettit v. Gingerich,152 a case strikingly similar to Tyler, a class of
black plaintiffs brought suit claiming that the Maryland State Bar Exami-
nation was violative of their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
guarantee. The district court granted summary judgment for the Bar Ex-
aminers.153
The plaintiffs claimed that the Bar Examiners’ intentional discrimination
was evidenced by the examiners’ ability to determine the race of the appli-
cants before the grading process and the disparity in passage rates between
black and white applicants.154 However, relying on Tyler’s reasoning, the
                                                                                                         
resolve this issue because they agreed that, even if the district court had possessed the subject
matter jurisdiction, there was not sufficient proof to entitle the plaintiffs to individual relief in
any case. Id. In fact, the court was divided on this question. Judge Hall wrote a separate, con-
curring opinion in which he stated that, while he agreed with the majority’s holding on the
merits, he was convinced that the district court did not, in fact, have the subject matter juris-
diction to review questions regarding the admission of individuals to the state bar. Id. at 1132.
Judge Hall concluded that such disappointed individuals’ proper recourse was to the state su-
preme court and then only to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 1133.
150. Id. at 1132. No doubt, the court was also not impressed by the fact that both Spain
and Kelley continued to fail on subsequent reexaminations. See id.
151. Id. at 1131.
152. 427 F. Supp. 282 (D. Md. 1977), aff’d sub nom. Pettit v. Ginerich, 582 F.2d 869
(4th Cir. 1978).
153. Id. at 294.
154. Id. at 290-91. Because the state did not record racial data on its bar applicants or re-
quire photographs during the years in question, plaintiffs’ evidence for the existence of a racial
disparity was based on information that they derived through an informal monitoring of the
exam by black candidates. Id. at 290 n.4. That information suggested that between 1962 and
1972, the passage rate of whites was approximately 50%, while that of blacks was 6%. Id.
Further, the plaintiffs alleged that for 10 of the 11 examination administrations between 1962
and 1973, approximately 50% of whites passed, while only 12% of blacks passed. Id. Lastly,
the plaintiffs alleged that between 1962 and 1972, approximately 70% of whites eventually
passed the exam after successive reexaminations, while only 20% of blacks eventually passed.
Id.
In addition, one failed black bar applicant, Charles Marshall, testified by affidavit that at a
post examination meeting between himself and one of the Bar Examiners, he discovered that
all of his examination books were marked with a small “c”. Id. at 291 n.5. Plaintiffs claimed
that such markings suggested that the examination books of black applicants were marked and
identified as belonging to a “colored” test taker before they were graded, id., like the different
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court held that the issue of whether there had been intentional discrimina-
tion was “conclusively disposed of” in the negative,155 since it found no
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of evidence of intentional dis-
crimination.156 In making such a finding, the court relied on the Maryland
State Bar Examiners’ sworn affidavits, in which they stated that they did
not and could not discriminate.157
Regarding the Pettit plaintiffs’ claims of inherent discrimination in the
Bar Exam, the court held that, based on Tyler and its progeny, “It is well
settled that the appropriate standard of review is whether the Maryland
Bar examination bears a rational relationship to the state’s admittedly
valid interests in professional licensure.”158 Moreover, the court observed
that the disparate racial impact of the Bar Examination by itself is not
                                                                                                         
color forms used to distinguish the black plaintiffs in the jury selection cases. See supra note
134. When Marshall asked the Board member about the letter on his examination books, he
was told that it represented an internal administrative code. 427 F. Supp. at 291 n.5. Addi-
tionally, the Pettit plaintiffs argued, as the Tyler plaintiffs had done, that the Bar Examiners
could also identify the examination books of black applicants by their black writing style, also
known as Black English. Id. at 291.
155. Id. at 291. The sole basis for this conclusive disposition of the plaintiffs’ claim of in-
tentional discrimination was the court’s reliance on the deposition of Board Chairman Gin-
gerich in which he represented that, based on their established procedures, the Board did not
have the opportunity to discriminate because it could not tell the race of any individual bar
applicant from that person’s exam materials, seating charts, etc. See id. Regarding the affidavit
testimony of the failed black applicant Marshall, who discovered that his examination books
had been marked with a small letter “c,” the court stated, “Apparently, plaintiffs wish this
court to construe the marking as meaning colored.” Id. However, without engaging in an ana-
lytical process, the court dismissed the possibility that such coding could exist, based on a de-
fense affidavit regarding the proctors’ practice during the examination of checking each test
taker’s name and seat number in order to check attendance. Id. at 292 n.6. Relying on that af-
fidavit, the court concluded that “[t]here is nothing in the record to suggest, however, that the
checking process has been used to gather racial information or that even if the process were so
used, that the Board had access to the data.” Id. at 291 n.5. Just as had been done in the Tyler
case, the Pettit court relied presumptively on the statement of the Board members in their affi-
davits that they did not, and could not, know the race of any individual test taker during the
grading process. The court’s faith in the word of the Board members was so strong that it
concluded that the “stringent procedures adopted by the Board . . . conclusively insure the
anonymity of Bar examination candidates and concomitantly, the impossibility of discrimina-
tion.” Id. at 292 (emphasis added). However, there was no evidence either requested or of-
fered to determine the existence or purpose of an alleged internal Board administrative proce-
dure that resulted in a small “c” being placed on all of Marshall’s exam books. Moreover, due
to the summary process disposition of this matter, the appellants were not afforded an oppor-
tunity to test the credibility of the testimony of the Bar Examiners on cross-examination before
a jury.
156. Id. at 292.
157. Id. at 291-92.
158. Id. at 292-93. (citing Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957);
Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1099-1101 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940
(1976); Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474, 476 n.5 (7th Cir. 1974);
Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699, 705 (8th Cir. 1971); Chaney v. State
Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1011, reh’g denied,
391 U.S. 929 (1968); Lewis v. Hartsock, No. 73-16 at 15-16 (S.D. Ohio, March 9, 1976);
Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 686 (N.D. Miss. 1974)).
750 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:721
enough to “evidence a suspect racial classification and thereby trigger a
strict scrutiny analysis.”159 Lastly, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim
that disparate racial results on the Bar Exam required the use of Title VII
standards to resolve their Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
claim.160
Following Tyler, the Pettit court found that the Bar Examination at is-
sue satisfied the rational relationship standard. Although the plaintiffs ad-
vanced undisputed evidence that Maryland’s Bar Examination did not
comport with standards for the educational and psychological tests as
published by the American Psychological Association,161 the court, again
relying on Tyler, found these concerns merely indicative of ways in which
the test could be improved and not “suggestions of constitutional infir-
mity.”162
In addressing the plaintiffs’ allegations that the Bar Examiners’ cutoff
score of seventy percent was arbitrary, the court again relied on Tyler
when it held that the cutoff was a “reasonable yardstick by which compe-
tence . . . may be determined.”163 However, it did not explain why this
cutoff was reasonable other than to note that a number of other states used
the same figure.164
5.   Delgado v. McTighe
While constitutional challenges to state bar examinations have been
universally unsuccessful in the South,165 minority plaintiffs have fared no
better in the North. One notable Northern case is Delgado v. McTighe.166
The plaintiffs in Delgado, three blacks and two Hispanics, claimed that
the Pennsylvania State Bar Examination violated their Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights.167 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed
that the Pennsylvania Bar Examiners changed the passing scores on the
examination arbitrarily and with the intent to discriminate against minor-
                                                                                                         
159. Id. at 293. However, the court noted that such disproportionality is not irrelevant;
rather, it simply is not “the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution.” Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)).
160. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248-52 (1976); Richardson v.
McFadden, 540 F.2d 744, 748-49 (4th Cir. 1976)).
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1102 (5th Cir. 1975)).
163. Id. (quoting Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 689 (N.D. Miss. 1974)).
164. Id. The court quoted the Shenfield court, which noted that a 70% cutoff score had
been adopted by 16 of the 24 states whose practices were known to it. Id. There was no indi-
cation as to the cutoff scores of the other 8 states and what, if any, standards should be em-
ployed to distinguish the arbitrary, but popular, standards from the rational and constitutional
ones. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text for discussion of the dissent’s view in
Tyler.
165. Tyler and Parrish were decided in Georgia and Alabama, respectively; Richardson
was decided in South Carolina; and Pettit was decided in Maryland.
166. 522 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
167. Id.
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ity applicants168 and that the Bar Examination was not rationally related to
its objectives.169
Unlike Tyler and its progeny, the Delgado plaintiffs’ claims were not
disposed of summarily by the federal district court. After undertaking a
thorough review of the history of black applications to the Pennsylvania
bar, the Delgado court admitted, “Frankly, some of the statistics are
shocking.”170 However, the court also noted the rather significant efforts
undertaken over the years by the Philadelphia Bar Association and the law
schools of Temple University and the University of Pennsylvania to study
this problem and to suggest corrective measures.171 The court also noted
that the instant case appeared “to be the first time that allegations of dis-
crimination by the Board [had] been subjected to judicial scrutiny.”172
At the conclusion of a fifteen-day trial, however, the court held that
the plaintiffs had “failed to carry their burden of proof with respect to
each of the two constitutional violations claimed by them.”173 The court
first concluded that the Bar Examiners had raised the passing scores “with
the sole aim of determining minimum competence.”174 In reaching its
finding, the court implicitly accepted the Bar Examiners’ argument that
although an initial low passing score had been set when the Multistate Bar
Examination (MBE) was added to the Pennsylvania Bar Examination in
1972,175 the intention had been to raise the score after a review of the test
results.176 It rejected the plaintiffs’ allegations that the adjustments vio-
lated the equal protection clause by disproportionately affecting blacks
                                                                                                         
168. Id. Scores were raised between February, 1973 and July, 1976. Id. at 895.
169. Id. at 886.
170. Id. For example, the court observed, “For the ten year period from 1933 to 1943, no
Black was admitted to the practice of law in Pennsylvania. . . . [F]rom July 1950 to the end of
1952, thirty Black candidates from Philadelphia County took a total of forty-three examina-
tions, some individuals being examined two or more times, and . . . only six of them passed.”
Id. at 886-87.
171. Id. at 887. The court noted that as early as 1953, the Chancellor of the Philadelphia
Bar Association appointed a Special Committee to “investigate the allegation of discrimination
in the grading of bar examinations.” Id. That committee, known as the “Hastie Committee,”
was chaired by the late William G. Hastie, a former Judge of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit. Id. & n.1. Subsequently, in 1970, the chancellor appointed Peter
G. Liacouras, then Dean of the Temple University Law School, to chair another committee to




174. Id. at 896.
175. Prior to 1972, the Pennsylvania Bar Exam was entirely essay in format. Id. at 888. In
February, 1972, the Board added the Multistate Bar Exam (MBE) to its Bar Examination. Id.
176. Id. at 889-91. In support of its argument, the Board noted that the percentage of
passing applicants “was much higher than it had been prior to the introduction of the MBE and
significantly higher than that of other states.” Id. at 891. The Board then contended that the
scores were raised from 55 to 60 to remedy this relatively high passage rate. Id. at 891-92.
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and minorities.177 Responding to the plaintiffs’ argument, the court stated
that to establish an equal protection violation it was the settled law that
plaintiffs must demonstrate that “actions having racially disproportionate
impact were done with a discriminatory intent or purpose.”178 The court
then found that it could not “draw an inference of discriminatory intent
and purpose on the basis of the plaintiffs’ showing of a disproportionate
impact”179 since the Bar Examination was neutral on its face and rationally
served the important state interest of protecting the public from incompe-
tent lawyers.180
In refusing to find discriminatory intent, the Delgado court rejected the
plaintiffs’ contention that the Bar Examiners had prior knowledge of the
adverse effect on minorities of raising the passing score.181 The court ac-
knowledged that the Board was in possession of an expert’s report stating
that raising the passing score would have a “profound effect” on the per-
centage of blacks who passed the Bar Exam.182 However, it observed that
the report also stated, “No matter where the passing score is set, except at
the very bottom, more blacks than whites will be failed.”183
The court did not discuss or analyze whether the discrimination was “a
motivating factor”184 as opposed to the sole motivation. For example,
there was no indication that, as a result of the report, the Board analyzed
the extent to which the examiners could set a lower passing score that
would both ensure competence and have the least racially disproportionate
impact on minorities. Indeed, the record demonstrates that once the report
indicated that there was not one passing score which had no racially dis-
proportionate impact, the Board did not even attempt to discover whether
                                                                                                         
177. Id. at 890. The court noted, however, that, in setting the passing score for the Febru-
ary, 1972 exam administration, Judge Wilkinson, then Chairman of the Board of Bar Examin-
ers, “believed that the appropriate passing grade for a combined essay-MBE examination
should be somewhere between 60 and 70.” Id. However, when Wilkinson asked the National
Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) and the Educational Testing Service (ETS), which had
prepared the MBE, to advise him regarding the establishment of a passing score, “neither or-
ganization was willing to recommend a passing score.” Id. However, in setting the passing
score, the court observed that “the Board has always been concerned exclusively with deter-
mining what grade in its view demonstrated minimum competence to practice law.” Id.
178. Id. at 895 (citing Personnel Adm’r v. Feeny, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976)). The court also pointed out that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs were not required to show that the challenged action was mo-
tivated solely by an intent to discriminate, but they did have to show that “a discriminatory
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision.” Id. (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S.
at 265-66).
179. Id. at 896.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 895.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 894.
184. Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
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it could establish a score that minimized that impact without sacrificing
competence.185
This observation is particularly interesting in light of the plaintiffs’
second argument that the Pennsylvania Bar Examination was not ration-
ally related to the Board’s goal of ensuring minimum competence.186 In
advancing this argument, the plaintiffs produced a good deal of expert
testimony that there were numerous, significant defects in the accuracy
and reliability of the Pennsylvania Bar Examination.187 Moreover, one of
the plaintiffs’ experts testified that the Pennsylvania Bar Examination was
not capable of measuring minimal competence to practice law because the
Board had made no determination as to “what constitutes incompetent
performance by an attorney.”188
However, without directly addressing the opinions of the plaintiffs’
expert witnesses, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ attacks on the Pennsyl-
vania Bar Exam. In doing so, the court held that the appropriate standard
of review for judging the constitutionality of a state bar exam under equal
protection analysis was whether it bears a “rational relationship” to the
goal of ensuring minimum competence.189
The court’s reasoning on this point was limited to references to Tyler
and its progeny. The court concluded from those decisions that other
courts had found the use of essay and multiple choice tests to be rationally
related to testing lawyer competence, even in the absence of model an-
swers, and even where different graders were using different methods of
grading essays190 and grading on a subjective basis.191
The court’s apparent unwillingness to address evidence in the form of
apparently undisputed expert testimony is quite troubling in what other-
wise appears to be a thorough and well-reasoned opinion. Once again, this
                                                                                                         
185. There is no discussion whatsoever in the case regarding whether such a score level
could be established. This absence was no doubt due to the court’s observation that the expert
had concluded that “[n]o matter where the passing point is set, except at the very bottom, more
blacks than whites will be failed.” Id.
186. Id. at 896.
187. Id. at 896-97. For example, one expert testified that, in his opinion, “the constitu-
tional law essay questions used in 1972 were not fit for use by law schools and that the model
answers to the two constitutional law questions were not correct.” Id. Another expert testified,
“In connection with the MBE, . . . a multiple choice test on legal subjects is of questionable
validity because, unlike a mathematics multiple choice test, very few of the wrong answers are
patently wrong and many of them are arguably correct.” Id. at 897.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 896 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Chaney v. State Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1011 (1968); Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282, aff’d per curiam, 582
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978)).
190. Id. at 897 (citing Richardson v. McFadden, 563 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976); Tyler v.
Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975)).
191. Id. (citing Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975)).
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court, as so many others considering this question have done, appears to
have relied too heavily on a presumption of credibility and good faith ac-
tion by the state Bar Examiners. This tendency is particularly surprising
in this case because the tone of much of this court’s opinion suggests that
it genuinely appreciates the significance of the problem of a racially dis-
proportionate bar passage rate. For example, although the court rejects
the plaintiffs’ claims and denies relief, it nevertheless concludes by saying
that it is “convinced . . . that the Blacks, for reasons which have not been
presented in this litigation, are failing the Pennsylvania Bar Examination
in disproportionate numbers. . . . [T]he record of their disproportionate
failures cries out for an in-depth study to ascertain the reason.”192
B.   Reflections on the Judicial Record
The history of judicial challenges to bar examinations that appear ra-
cially discriminatory in their impact has been discouraging, inhospitable,
and, to some extent, irrational. The prospect for the future of such legal
challenges is bleak.193
                                                                                                         
192. Id. at 898. The court went on to observe that, when such a study is conducted, it
“should include a comparative analysis of the answers of those applicants who failed to pass
with the answers of those who received a passing grade. It was testified at trial that the appli-
cants’ answers were not available to the plaintiffs for the period covered in this litigation be-
cause it was the practice of the Board to destroy the applicants’ answers after a period of
time.” Id. at 898 n.4.
This suggestion seems to imply that such a comparison might reveal that otherwise compa-
rable answers were given different grades and that the practice of the Board in not maintaining
their applicants’ answers for a reasonable period of time, especially in light of their awareness
of the existence of this problem, was itself suspect and should be corrected. It is also disturb-
ing to note that, at least in the state of Pennsylvania, no such in-depth study was subsequently
conducted, despite this court’s clarion call for one.
193. In describing the prospects for the future of racial discrimination legal challenges to
the bar exam as “bleak,” I mean only to suggest that it looks that way to me. The inhospitable
attitudinal bent of the judiciary to such challenges and the current national mood against af-
firmative action and any policies aimed at leveling the playing field and providing opportunities
to minorities and women, who have for so long been the victims of officially sanctioned dis-
crimination by the organized bar, leave me with a heavy heart.
The institutional opposition by the bar to minority participation in the law is legion. For ex-
ample, it was not until 1964 that the Association of American Law Schools’ Committee on
Racial Discrimination could first state that no member American law school reported denying
admission to any applicant on the basis of race or color. SEGAL, supra note 7, at 3. Consider,
for example, Dr. Segal’s moving description of the American Bar Association reaction to the
first black attorney admitted to membership:
In 1912, racism within the legal community was so rampant that a storm arose over
the “inadvertent” election of the first three black attorneys to the American Bar As-
sociation by its Executive Committee. When the Executive Committee discovered
that it had unknowingly elected three members “of the colored race,” the committee
rescinded its prior action, stating that “the settled practice of the Association has
been to elect only white men to membership."
Id. at 17.
Though the ABA did, ultimately, declare these men to be members, thereafter it passed a
resolution requiring all recommendations for membership to be accompanied by the disclosure
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1.   Discouraging History
Courts have ruled in favor of state bar examiners almost without ex-
ception.194 Most often courts dismiss summarily, relying almost exclu-
sively on the good faith word of the bar examiners themselves, thereby
denying plaintiffs an opportunity to have a full and fair hearing in court.195
As the dissent pointed out in Tyler, summary judgment is particularly in-
appropriate in cases where motive is a pivotal issue.
Of course, this is not meant as a blanket indictment of state bar exam-
iners across the nation. But given the stakes involved and the troubled ra-
cial history of this country, it seems especially unfair to disallow these
plaintiffs a chance to have such claims heard on the merits. The trial set-
ting provides an opportunity to test the credibility of the witnesses by
cross-examination before a jury, rather than relying solely on their testi-
mony by affidavit.196 Such uniform losses by these plaintiffs have no
doubt deterred others from even attempting to prosecute what may be
meritorious claims.197
                                                                                                         
of the race and sex of the prospective member. Id. That resolution remained in place for more
than 30 years and was not rescinded until 1943. See id. at 19.
To this day, of the 23,000 black lawyers and judges in America, over 18,000 are members
of the National Bar Association (NBA), which is a national black bar association, and have
joined either in addition to, or instead of, joining the American Bar Association. Unfortu-
nately, the current growth and vitality of the NBA is a sad and continuing reminder of the con-
tinuing need for such an organization. See Revius O. Ortique, Jr., The National Bar Associa-
tion—Not Just an Option!, 53 JUDICATURE 390 (1970).
194. See supra part III.A.1-5.
195. See, e.g., supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
196. By rough analogy to a criminal proceeding, these results are similar to the situation
where the accused defendant denies by sworn affidavit that he committed the crime charged or
even had the opportunity to do it and the case is dismissed for lack of any material issue of fact
because the court believes that the accused has sworn his innocence in good faith. Similarly, in
the civil context, if corporate officers charged by their shareholders with breaches of their fi-
duciary duties were to deny by sworn affidavit that they committed the offense or even had the
opportunity to do it, the case would be dismissed for lack of any issue of material fact should
the court be impressed in a like manner with the defendants’ good faith. These examples illus-
trate both the logical and practical absurdity of allowing defendants to escape liability by sum-
mary judgment solely on the strength of their sworn affidavits of innocence and lack of oppor-
tunity.  Nevertheless, this is precisely what has occurred time and time again when minority
plaintiffs challenge bar examiners in court. Clearly, in both the criminal and civil examples
cited, the proper response should be, if a prima facie case has been made out, that those ac-
cused, notwithstanding their good faith denials, must stand trial and have their credibility
tested in the crucible of cross-examination before a jury, which under our system is the best
test for determining the truth.
197. It can also be argued that so many failed challenges to bar examinations might have
actually discouraged some blacks from even going to law school in the first place, since the
prospects of passing the bar appear to be so dim.
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2.   Inhospitable History
Historically, courts have been inhospitable to claims of racial dis-
crimination in state bar examinations. As shown previously,198 the lan-
guage and tone of many of these courts’ opinions has been decidedly con-
descending, dismissive, insensitive, and hostile to entertaining the plain-
tiffs’ causes of action. The reasons for such an attitude are not altogether
clear, although it is not unreasonable to infer that such responses might
relate to the fact that the plaintiffs’ attacks have been directed at the very
system that initially validated the judges themselves. Thus, judges who
identify with the current system on some level may perceive an attack on
the system as an attack on themselves and their own credibility and worth
as products of the current system.199
In trying to understand such underlying hostility, it is also important to
consider both the geographical and generational context in which these
cases arose. Most arose in Southern states, whose history of race relations
has been, at best, dreadful, and, at worst, shameful. That sad part of our
                                                                                                         
198. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
199. There is no way to determine definitively why some judges appear to be hostile and
unreceptive to attacks on the bar examination. There may be a number of different explana-
tions or only one. However, one possible source of such judicial hostility may be a heightened
sense of personal identification with the bar examination system by the judges themselves. As
successful products of that system, they may feel a personal stake in perpetuating their own
personal, as well as the public’s, perception of it as a fair meritocracy. However, it might be
argued that judges should feel a similar personal allegiance when they preside over cases
where attorneys are sued for malpractice. I suggest that the two situations are distinctly differ-
ent. When plaintiffs challenge the bar examination system, they are claiming that it is a biased
process that does not truly measure or reward merit alone. By implication, some may feel that
if the system is tainted, to some extent those who bear its imprimatur are similarly tainted. In
contrast, when an attorney is sued for malpractice, the plaintiff is not attacking the system that
judged him fit to practice; rather, they are leveling a personal accusation at a particular attor-
ney’s handling of a particular case. In essence, they are not saying that the system is blame-
worthy but that the attorney is personally blameworthy in his conduct of a particular case. The
cause of the attorney’s malpractice may have been incompetence, which, to some extent, does
implicate the system that produced him. However, it may also have been due to a host of fac-
tors that are all personal to the attorney and do not necessarily implicate the system, such as
inefficiency, inattention, malfeasance, etc. Consequently, a judge hearing an attorney malprac-
tice case is far less likely to feel personally implicated than when hearing a challenge to the bar
examination itself. In fact, a judge hearing a malpractice case would reasonably view the sys-
tem as “good,” in the sense of establishing sensible standards of attorney conduct, and the in-
dividual attorney as blameworthy, to the extent that he violated those standards. Thus, in being
called upon to rule in favor of a plaintiff suing an attorney, judges could reasonably view
themselves as defending the system. However, in being called upon to rule in favor of a plain-
tiff challenging the bar examination on the basis of illegal bias, judges could reasonably view
themselves as endorsing an attack on the system. Some judges could understandably view such
an attack on the system, by implication, as an attack on themselves. As a consequence, in an
effort to defend themselves, such judges might well feel the need to defend the system in ways
that do not afford a full and fair evaluation to the plaintiff’s case. I am not suggesting that this
judicial resistance is always either conscious or intentional, although sometimes it may be.
More often than not, it is more likely an unconscious and unintentional reaction to a subtle and
perceived affront to their status as the deserving products of a fair meritocracy.
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nation’s history saw all levels and branches of government, particularly in
the South, conspire to create and perpetuate a system of racial bigotry and
white dominance.200 Perhaps it is idealistic to believe that the 1970s and
1980s saw the disappearance of all remaining vestiges of these attitudes
from the minds of state officials, such as members of state boards of bar
examiners or the judiciary.
In addition, most of the state officials and judges who reviewed the
actions of the various bar examiners grew up during a time when minori-
ties were virtually nonexistent in our nation’s law schools. As a result,
few, if any, of them had any exposure to minority students or professors
in their law school classes. It is not unreasonable to suggest, as the dissent
in Tyler noted,201 that some of these judges and officials probably still
harbored presumptions of racial inferiority about blacks, in general, and
aspiring black lawyers, in particular—presumptions that colored their
judgment when they considered the plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination in
bar examinations.202
3.   Irrational History
Lastly, the history of judicial challenges to bar examinations has been
somewhat irrational because of the courts’ not infrequent refusal to apply
simple logic. In Tyler, for example, the court held that Title VII standards
did not apply to the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim because, under the
terms of the act, the Bar Examiners were not “employers” or “an em-
ployment agency.”203 But the plaintiffs had not claimed that Title VII ap-
plied by its terms; rather, they urged the court to apply the standards of
Title VII by analogy.204
The plaintiffs argued that although the Bar Examiners might not be
“employers” or “an employment agency” by definition, they so strikingly
resembled the categories defined therein that they should be treated the
                                                                                                         
200. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the voting rights cases, where
under the official state and local policy, black voters were identified by such methods as using
different color cards or tickets or the letter “c,” for colored, beside their names; state and local
officials in the South not only instituted and utilized these blatantly discriminatory systems but,
when challenged, vigorously defended them in court).
201. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1106 (5th Cir. 1975).
202. The optimistic view is to consider this perspective wholly generational and, therefore,
a problem of the past which fades daily as that generation of lawyers and officials grows older
and retires. However, a more realistic view is that the prospects for a radically different expe-
rience for the lawyers of today and even tomorrow are not terribly hopeful, given statistics that
indicate that only about 10% of the law school population consists of minorities and that there
has been only a 0.1% increase in the number of black lawyers in the last 10 years. See
YAMAKI ET AL., supra note 6, at 9-10 (law school minority populations); Carey & Parker, su-
pra note 25, at A1 (black lawyers).
203. Tyler 517 F.2d at 1096.
204. Id. at 1095. See also material on U.C.C. Article 2 and use of rules by analogy, infra
note 206.
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same vis-à-vis their alleged discrimination.205 In other words, if Title VII
prohibits an employer from excluding a minority from a particular job
through utilization of an employment test that does not test the skills re-
quired for the job in question, why should the bar examiners be allowed
to utilize a similar type of test that excludes minorities from working
anywhere in the entire state?
Application of rules of law by analogy from one area of the law to
another similar area is common practice. In fact, it is done with increas-
ing frequency in many fields.206 However, although the court in Tyler re-
ferred to the plaintiffs’ analogical argument in its recitation of the facts,
the court did not address it in the analysis or holding. Instead, the court
addressed the plaintiffs’ claims as if they had asserted jurisdiction under
Title VII directly and then dismissed that claim with a wave of the hand in
their oft-cited not-an-employer reference.207
                                                                                                         
205. Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1096.
206. A particularly illustrative example is Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), which specifically applies only to the sale of goods. However, Article 2 has been
applied in a great many contexts that do not expressly involve the sale of goods. Such cases fall
into two general categories: sales of goods with non-goods and sales of goods with services. A
minority of courts apply Article 2 only to the goods sold in the transaction, while the majority
apply Article 2 to the entire transaction or not at all depending upon whether the “predominant
purpose” of the whole transaction was a sale of goods. “[I]n the overwhelming majority of
cases, Article 2 has been found applicable.” 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 26 (3d ed. 1988) (citations omitted); see, e.g., E. Allen Farn-
sworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 678 (1963) (“Is it not possible that the general obliga-
tion of good faith with the merchant’s objective standard may be extended by analogy to con-
tracts not literally within the purview of the Code? The comments to the Code suggest the
possibility of such extension.”) (citing U.C.C. Sec 1-102, comment 1); see also E. Allan Farn-
sworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1957)
(suggesting that sales warranties should be extended by analogy to bailments and contracts in-
volving only the provision of services as opposed to goods); Cecil J. Hunt, II The Price of
Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 719, 770-71 n.321 (1994) (noting that the U.C.C.’s express application to the
sale of goods can be reasonably extended to the context of a commercial loan).
Article 2 of the Code applies only to the “sale of goods.” However, it can be applied
to the lender-borrower relationship from any one or more of three different perspec-
tives: (1) by analogizing the underlying purposes and policies behind the rules per-
taining to both types of transactions (The U.C.C. provides that it should be ‘liberally
construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies[.]’); or (2) by
characterizing their relationship as a “mix” of a transaction involving both goods and
services; or (3) by characterizing the borrowed funds in a loan transaction as
“goods” in and of themselves.
Hunt, supra, at 770-71 n.321 (citations omitted).
207. See Tyler, 517 F.2d at 1096 (concluding that the Georgia Board of Bar Examiners
was neither an “employer,” an “employment agency,” nor a “labor organization” within the
meaning of Title VII). It is interesting to note that all subsequent cases faced with this question
cite Tyler for the proposition that Title VII does not apply to the equal protection analysis of a
challenge to a bar examination, and Tyler’s exact language has been reiterated in other cases.
See, e.g., Woodward v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 598 F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1979).
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4.   A Bleak Future
For a number of reasons, the future of constitutional challenges to bar
examinations is bleak. First, there appears to be a general judicial hostil-
ity to any suit alleging racial discrimination by bar examiners. Second,
the courts have consistently refused to apply Title VII standards, even by
analogy, to bar examination challenges.208 Third, and perhaps most sig-
nificantly, the future looks bleak in light of the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,209 wherein the Court im-
plicitly overruled Griggs v. Duke Power Co.210
Although courts have consistently refused to apply the standards
enunciated in Griggs to bar examination challenges, as long as Griggs
remained good law it provided a powerful framework for resolving dis-
crimination claims by giving plaintiffs the hope that they might someday
persuade a court to apply its standards in the context of a bar examination
challenge.
Under Griggs, a plaintiff who charged an employer211 with discrimina-
tion was initially required to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion.212 That case could consist of statistics evidencing a racial imbalance
in the workforce in order to prove a disparate impact by the employer’s
practices.213 If the plaintiff was successful in establishing his prima facie
case, the burden then shifted to the defendant,214 who could raise the af-
firmative defense of business necessity.215 To the extent the defendant
proved such necessity, the plaintiff could then rebut that proof by showing
that a less discriminatory standard existed which the defendant had failed
to utilize216 and, that therefore, the defendant’s actions were a pretext for
intentional discrimination.217
                                                                                                         
208. This refusal was based solely on the reasoning that since bar examiners were neither
employers nor employment agencies, Title VII did not apply by it own terms. See supra notes
67-70 and accompanying text discussing Tyler.
209. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
210. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
211. See supra notes 60-69 discussing the employer employment agency theory of Title
VII as applied by analogy.
212. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432; see also Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Impact of
Hobbe[s]’s Empirical Natural Law on Title VII’s Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN.
L. REV. 607, 609 (1993). Professor Robinson noted that, even after Title VII was amended,
“[t]hese amendments proved ineffective, and in 1989 the Court decided Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio which severely weakened the Griggs disparate impact approach. As a result,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 . . . , the purpose of which was to counteract the
Supreme Court’s more conservative jurisprudence.” Robinson, supra, at 609 (citations omit-
ted).
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Under Wards Cove, the Griggs standard was altered in two very im-
portant ways. First, the affirmative defense of business necessity, a rather
strict standard and usually difficult to meet,218 was eliminated.219 In its
place, the defendant now need only show a legitimate business purpose
for his practice220—a much less stringent standard.221 Second, under Wards
Cove, a defendant has the burden of production only on the issue of busi-
ness necessity, while the burden of persuasion ultimately rests with the
plaintiff.222 But most importantly, in Wards Cove, the Supreme Court re-
jected the use of statistics alone as evidence of racial imbalance in the
workforce and as probative of the racially disparate impact of an em-
ployer’s practices.223 Instead, under Wards Cove, in order to prove a
prima facie case, the plaintiff must now establish a narrower comparison
between the racial composition of the relevant workforce and the other-
wise qualified labor pool.224 Through its holding in Wards Cove, the Su-
preme Court signaled a “future constriction of the use of broad statistical
comparisons previously allowed under Griggs.”225
                                                                                                         
218. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1989).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. In determining whether this test had been met, the Wards Cove Court noted that
“the dispositive issue is whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legiti-
mate employment goals of the employer.” Id. at 659. However, the Court also pointed out
that, in order to be considered “legitimate employer goals,” the justification had to be more
than just a mere insubstantial one “because such a low standard of review would permit dis-
crimination to be practiced through . . . spurious . . . employment practices.” Id. However,
the Court also concluded that “there is no requirement that the challenged practice be
‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business for it to pass muster.” Id.
222. Id. at 657-60. Thus, under Wards Cove, employers need only plead, but not prove, a
legitimate employment goal. Id. at 660. The burden then shifts to plaintiffs to identify with
specificity the particular employment practice that they claim violates Title VII. Id. In support
of its holding that the burden of persuasion must rest on the plaintiff, the Court in Wards Cove
quoted 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a) (1988): “The persuasion burden here must remain with the
plaintiff, for it is he who must prove that it was ‘because of such individual’s race, color,’ etc.,
that he was denied a desired employment opportunity.” Id.; see also Robinson, supra note
212, at 638.
With this 1989 decision, the Court redefined the thrust of Title VII and limited
Griggs[’] liberal scope of liability. Wards Cove thus established a new touchstone.
Under Wards Cove, employers needed to prove only that challenged practices served
legitimate goals ‘in a significant way.’ This rule could be viewed as undermining Ti-
tle VII’s goal of absolute equality in the workplace and as supplanting Griggs’ liberal
liability threshold. To this extent, Wards Cove redefined Title VII.
Robinson, supra note 212, at 638.
223. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61.
224. Id. at 661.
225. Kenneth Williams, A Legal Challenge to Bar Examinations, 16 T. MARSHALL L.
REV. 537, 539 n.24 (1991) (quoting Recent Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 806, 808 n.21 (1990)).
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5.   A Ray of Hope
a.   Equal Protection
Although the future of challenges to bar examinations is bleak, it is not
altogether dark. While the courts have refused to apply the highest stan-
dard of strict scrutiny in equal protection challenges against bar examina-
tions, there is some evidence that a challenge based on the lower rational
relationship standard could be successful. In Sharif v. New York State
Education Department,226 a recent gender discrimination challenge based
upon this lower standard, a court struck down as unconstitutional a state
educational department policy; the court found the policy not rationally
related to the state’s purpose.227
In Sharif, the plaintiffs sued the New York Education Department for
violating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Title IX
of the Education Amendments.228 The plaintiffs claimed the department’s
policy of relying exclusively on high school Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
scores in awarding merit scholarships illegally discriminated against fe-
males.229 The stated goal awarding merit scholarships was to reward aca-
demic achievement in high school.230 However, it was adduced that the
SAT’s primary purpose is to predict academic performance in the first year
of college.231 Focusing on the state’s stated scholarship goal of rewarding
academic achievement in high school, the plaintiffs made a compelling case
that it was contradictory to reward high school achievement based on a test
that did not measure such achievement, but rather only potential college
performance. By focusing the court on this clear contradiction between the
stated goal and the means to achieve the state’s policy, the plaintiffs suc-
cessfully argued that the state failed to validate its exclusive reliance on the
SAT as a rational, gender-neutral basis for awarding merit scholarships.232
The equal protection arguments successfully advanced in Sharif regard-
ing validation and exclusive reliance on a standardized test could readily be
                                                                                                         
226. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
227. Id. at 348.
228. Id. Under Title IX all federally funded educational programs are prohibited from dis-
criminating on the basis of gender. Id. at 360 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988)).
229. Id. at 348.
230. Id. at 364.
231. Id.
232. The plaintiffs’ evidence of disparate impact was primarily statistical. For example,
they demonstrated that for the academic year 1986-87, girls represented 53% of the applicants
for the state merit scholarships, id. at 355 n.26; however, only 43% of the scholarship recipi-
ents were girls that year, id. at 355. The plaintiffs argued that this gender-based disparate im-
pact was the result of the state’s use of a testing standard that was not rationally related to its
purpose and therefore deprived them of equal protection under the law. Id. at 348; see also
Kary L. Moss, Standardized Tests as a Tool of Exclusion: Improper Use of the SAT in New
York, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 230, 238 (1989-90) (discussing Sharif).
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applied to any bar examination challenge. The essence of the argument
would be that under the Equal Protection Clause, sole reliance on the bar
examination as a basis for admitting attorneys to practice law is not ration-
ally related to the state’s goal of ensuring minimum competence among li-
censed attorneys.
This argument has two components; the first is definitional and the
second involves a problem of measurement. The state’s goal of protecting
the public by ensuring the minimum competence of its attorneys suffers
from a serious definitional problem—quite simply, no one has been able
successfully to define “minimum competence.” And, to the extent such a
state of competence does exist, it has not been established whether the bar
examination can, in fact, measure that ability.
b.   Title VII
Beginning with Tyler, the courts that have considered the issue consis-
tently hold that Title VII is inapplicable to discrimination challenges
against bar examinations. Blindly obedient233 to the reasoning in Tyler,
courts find that because bar examiners are neither an “employer” nor “an
employment agency,” Title VII by its terms does not apply to claims of
racial discrimination against state bar examiners.234
The scope of the term “employer” under Title VII is quite broad.235
State and local governments have long been considered employers under
Title VII.236 Thus, because a board of bar examiners performs a sovereign
function of the state,237 it can be argued that these state boards are, in fact,
“agents” of the state and should therefore be treated the same as the state.
Such an argument is supported by Woodard v. Virginia Board of Bar Ex-
                                                                                                         
233. See W. Sherman Rogers, Title VII Preemption of State Bar Examinations: Applicabil-
ity of Title VII to State Occupational Licensing Tests, 32 HOW. L.J. 563, 602 (1989)
(analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Tyler and its progeny and concluding that, “[f]or
whatever reason, the Fifth Circuit’s statement seems to have been blindly accepted by other
courts without scrutiny”).
234. See, e.g., Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 598 F.2d 1345, 1346 (1979);
Parrish v. Board of Comm’rs of Ala. State Bar, 533 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1976); Delgado
v. McTighe, 442 F. Supp. 725, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see Woodard v. Virginia Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 420 F. Supp. 211, 213 (E.D. Va. 1976).
235. An employer is defined as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who
has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks
in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
236. See Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(a) (1988) (amending definition of “person” to include governments, governmental
agencies, and political subdivisions); see also Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223, 228 n.1 (1988)
(noting how the 1972 amendments to Title VII made states and local governments “employers”
under Title VII for the first time); see generally Rogers, supra note 227, at 563.
237. See Sparks v. The Character & Fitness Committee of Kentucky, 818 F.2d 541 (6th
Cir. 1987) (holding state bar examiners performed quasi-judicial function of state supreme
court).
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aminers,238 in which the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
expressly found that a Board of Bar Examiners was an “employer” under
Title VII because the Board was acting as the state’s agent in performing
the function of licensing attorneys to practice in that state.239 In so hold-
ing, the Woodard court said that it was
satisfied that the Board is an agent of the state which unquestionably
employs the requisite number of persons. The statutory definition of
employer includes agents of persons employing fifteen or more per-
sons. The Board’s statutory origin, its role in performing the sovereign
function of licensing professions, and the statutory restrictions placed
on its authority are the primary factors supporting the Court’s conclu-
sion that an agency relationship exists.240
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the court found that principles of fed-
eralism militated against extending Title VII’s test validation standards to
professional licensing examinations.241 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit re-
lied on Tyler in holding that the state Board of Bar Examiners was neither
an “employer” nor “an employment agency.”242
In the year prior to Woodard, the Supreme Court clarified the
“employer” issue by holding that an employer covered by Title VII could
not escape the Act’s jurisdiction merely “by delegating discriminatory
programs to [others]. . . . Title VII applies to ‘any agent’ of a covered
employer.”243 Additionally, in Title VII jurisprudence, the Second Circuit
has held that the term “employer” is “sufficiently broad to encompass any
party who significantly affects access of any individual to employment
opportunities, regardless of whether that party may technically be de-
scribed as an ‘employer’ of an aggrieved individual as that term has gen-
erally been defined at common law.”244 The judicial pronouncement sug-
gests that there is no analytical or policy reason why state bar examiners
should not be held to Title VII standards.
                                                                                                         
238. 420 F. Supp. 211 (1976), aff’d, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979).
239. Id. at 213 n.3.
240. Id. (citations omitted).
241. Id. at 214. In so holding, the court reasoned, “The Supreme Court has recognized
‘that the States have a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their bounda-
ries, and that as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid inter-
ests they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regulating the
practice of professions.’ ”  Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792
(1975) (emphasis added by Woodard court)).
242. Woodward v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 598 F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1979).
243. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718 n.33 (1978)
(citations omitted).
244. Spirt v. Teacher Ins. and Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1063 (2d Cir. 1982), va-
cated and remanded, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983) (citations omitted).
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IV.   THE MYTH OF THE BAR EXAM AS A TEST OF MINIMUM COMPETENCE
A.   Definitional Barriers
In an open forum designed as a comprehensive review of its bar ex-
amination procedure, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that
[t]he fallacy in the professed rationale [of ensuring minimum compe-
tency] for the existence of the bar examination is that none of the ex-
pert witnesses could define minimum competency. Not only in New
Mexico, but in all states, . . . one is left with the anomalous situation
of adhering to a licensing system for the state bar which though pur-
porting to safeguard the public from practitioners who do not meet
minimum standards of competency, cannot define the standard it uses.
The obvious question is how one can adequately measure a criterion
that eludes definition.245
Clearly, in order for a bar examination to be a legitimate test of mini-
mum competence to practice law, it must be rooted in a reasonable defi-
nition of the very quality it professes to measure. However, not only have
bar examiners noticeably failed to articulate a reasonable definition, but
they have also failed to enunciate any definition at all.
In Delgado v. McTighe,246 one of the plaintiffs’ experts testified that
“the bar examination could not measure minimal competence to practice
law unless some determination was made as to what constitutes incompe-
tent performance by an attorney.”247 The American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar issued a re-
port in 1979 that attempted to define lawyer competence.248 That report
identified three basic elements of lawyer competence: 1) the capacity to
perform fundamental skills including analysis, legal research, and com-
munication; 2) knowledge of the law and legal institutions; and 3) the
ability and motivation to apply skills and knowledge to legal tasks with
reasonable proficiency.249
Similarly, the American Bar Foundation (ABF) made an attempt to
define lawyer competence by utilizing a survey of Chicago lawyers to so-
                                                                                                         
245. Susan E. Brown & Claire Levay, Melendez v. Burciaga: Revealing the State of the
Art in Bar Examinations, B. EXAMINER, May 1982, at 4, 6; see supra notes 165-177 and ac-
companying text (discussing Delgado v. McTighe and describing how neither the officials from
the Educational Testing Service, which designed the Multistate Bar Exam, nor the National
Conference of Bar Examiners could advise the Pennsylvania Bar Examiners as to what passing
score would ensure minimum competence).
246. 522 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
247. Id. at 897.
248. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE
ROLE OF THE LAW SCHOOLS (1979) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
249. Id. at 9.
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licit their views on the skills and knowledge necessary to practice law.250
That survey compiled the following hierarchy of skills and knowledge
comprising legal competence: 1) the ability to marshal facts; 2) the ability
to gather facts; 3) the ability to instill confidence in others; 4) effective
oral expression; 5) the ability to read and comprehend written judicial
opinions, statutes, and other sources of law; 6) knowledge of substantive
legal principles; 7) the ability to conduct legal research; 8) the ability to
conduct effective negotiations; and 9) the ability to draft precise legal
documents.251
In commenting on both the ABA and ABF reports, several experts in
the field have concluded that “the bar examination does not assure compe-
tence in basic lawyering skills, although it does test knowledge of the law
and the ability to analyze legal problems.”252 Similarly, others have ar-
gued that “the bar examination is totally unrelated to . . . the successful
practice of law”253 and is little more than a memory test.254 Reports by
such experts have concluded that the examination is “indefensible, a psy-
chometric anachronism, on the grounds that it assertedly fails to satisfy
the minimum requirements of test validity.”255 A leading critic concluded
that it is “unthinkable that a group can study bias in a test without ever
having defined that criterion (adequacy of attorney functioning) that the
test is to predict.”256 Still other critics have characterized the bar exami-
nation as nothing more than an achievement test “designed to assess spe-
cific accomplishments in a student’s legal education.”257
                                                                                                         
250. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON CON-
TINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, A PEER REVIEW SYSTEM: DISCUSSION DRAFT 11 (1980)
[hereinafter ALI-ABA COMMITTEE DRAFT].
251. Id. at 154.
252. Stephen P. Klein, Summary of Research on the Multistate Bar Examination, B.
EXAMINER, Aug. 1983, at 10, 13; see also John F. O’Hara & Stephen P. Klein, Is the Bar Ex-
amination an Adequate Measure of Lawyer Competence, B. EXAMINER, Aug. 1981, at 28, 29.
Dr. Klein, perhaps the most prominent defender of the bar exam on the basis of statistical cor-
relations, has further acknowledged that “[n]o studies have attempted to correlate MBE
(Multistate Bar Exam) scores with ‘success as a lawyer’ because of the difficulty of obtaining
agreement as to a valid measure of success." See Rogers, supra note 233, at 590.
253. Edward F. Bell, Do Bar Examinations Serve a Useful Purpose?, 57 A.B.A. J. 1215,
1216 (1971). The author also concludes that to the extent that the bar exam’s purpose is to de-
termine lawyer competence, “that purpose has not been accomplished. There are many grossly
incompetent lawyers practicing law today who have passed a bar examination that failed to
eliminate them and to prevent them from practicing on an unsuspecting public.” Id.
254. Id.
255. RICHARD S. BARRETT, COMMISSION ON TESTING AND PUBLIC POLICY, CONTENT
VALIDITY IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING 89 (1989) (draft report); see also Emsellem, supra note
5, at 44.
256. Symposium, The Minority Candidate and the Bar Examination, 5 BLACK L.J. 120,
178 (1977).
257. Alfred E. Carlson & Charles E. Werts, Relationships Among Law School Predictors,
Law School Performance, and Bar Exam Results, 3 REPORTS OF LSAC SPONSORED RESEARCH
211, 214 (Sept. 1976). But see Erwin N. Griswold, In Praise of Bar Examinations, 60 A.B.A.
J. 81 (Jan. 1974).
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Moreover, in an uncharacteristic display of candor, the court in Rich-
ardson v. McFadden,258 although ruling against the plaintiffs’ challenge to
a bar examination, concluded that the bar examination did not adequately
measure lawyer competence:
While the Bar Examiners do not concede that they would lose under
[Title VII], we believe the record is inadequate to demonstrate either
“criterion” (“predictive”), “content,” or “construct” validity under
professionally acceptable methods. Thus, if we were to determine that
Title VII standards were applicable, it would be necessary to reverse
and declare the South Carolina Bar Examination constitutionally inva-
lid.259
Significantly, the New York State Bar Association also concluded that
the New York Bar Examination did not ensure lawyer competence.260 The
Bar Association commissioned a study on lawyer competence and the Bar
Examination.261 The commission charged with conducting the survey
concluded that “[n]either the multiple choice nor the essay examinations
can ensure that students have adequate lawyering skills to enable them to
engage in the practice of law.”262
Defenders of the bar examination in its current state counter these
criticisms by arguing that there is a strong statistical correlation among
the criteria for successful performance on the bar, achievement on the
Law School Admission Test (LSAT), and law school grades (LGPA).263
These statistical correlations clearly indicate, they contend, that candi-
dates who perform well on the LSAT and achieve a high LGPA are more
likely to pass the bar.264
This analysis forms the basis for arguments that the answer to racially
disproportionate bar performance is improvement in the academic prepa-
ration of minority law school students both before and during law school.
The argument is that increased academic preparation before law school
yields higher LSAT scores, which, in turn, produce higher law school
grades. And the combination of higher LSAT scores and LGPAs results
in significantly higher minority bar passage rates.
This line of reasoning contains at least two fundamentally erroneous
assumptions. First, the theory wrongly assumes that the performance on
the LSAT is strongly correlated to success in law school. In fact, as a
predictor of success in law school, the LSAT is wrong more than fifty
                                                                                                         
258. 540 F.2d 744 (4th Cir. 1976).
259. Id. at 746-47.
260. See THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY 52-54 (1988) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION].
261. See id. at 48.
262. Id. at 54.
263. See generally KLEIN & BOLUS, supra note 3, at 2-3.
264. Id.
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percent of the time,265 and particularly so with respect to minority stu-
dents.266
Second, the theory wrongly assumes that a positive correlation among
bar passage rates, LSAT scores, and LGPAs has a direct relationship to
bar candidates’ abilities to practice law competently. Positive correlations
between two different measures, such as LSAT/LGPA and bar passage,
may evidence nothing more than the fact that each index is measuring es-
sentially the same thing, that is, the same legal skills and knowledge.267
While, to those not familiar with statistical analysis, a high statistical cor-
relation “would seem to corroborate the very validity of the bar examina-
tion, . . . indeed it should suggest the contrary.”268 As one noted expert in
the testing field has concluded, “[A] high correlation is not something you
should have striven for in the first place. . . . Why do you want a high
correlation? The higher the correlation, the more you’re measuring the
same thing.”269
While the bar examination may be an excellent test of the ability to
study law competently, it does not necessarily indicate the ability to prac-
tice law competently. In fact, legal educators and practitioners now
widely acknowledge that the bar examination is really just a rite of pas-
sage which “functions more as an exit examination, a law school compre-
hensive, than as a professional entrance examination.”270 Moreover, many
legal experts have concluded that “the bar exam was doing the wrong
thing at the wrong time; it tests one’s ability to take tests. . . .
[E]xaminers should not be trying to validate a person’s educational expe-
rience, but rather one’s character and fitness for practice.”271
                                                                                                         
265. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Law School Exams and Minority-Group Students, 7 BLACK L.J.
304, 307 n.5 (1981) (“LSAT scores are only statistical predictions that are accurate less than
fifty percent of the time.”).
266. James C. Hathaway, The Mythical Meritocracy of Law School Admissions, 34 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 86, 86 (1984) (indicating that over the course of a law school career, the LSAT
is a “particularly inaccurate predictor of academic success for various subgroups including
men, younger students, and members of racial minorities”).
267. Brown & Levay, supra note 245, at 7; see also Carlson Werts, supra note 257, at
220.
268. Brown & Levay, supra note 245, at 7.
269. Id. at 12 (testimony of Dr. Ralph Hoepfner before the New Mexico Supreme Court)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
270. Erica Moeser, At the Gap: Bar Admissions Issues That Are Relevant to the MacCrate
Discussion, in THE MACCRATE REPORT 83, 84 (Conference Proceedings, Minneapolis-St.
Paul, Minn., Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1993).
271. Id. at 138-39. It should be noted that, as the reporter for a discussion group, the
author was expressing the views of the members of her group, and not just her own. For ex-
ample, she concludes by noting, “There was widespread agreement among this discussion
group that the MacCrate Report and this conference could serve as a catalyst for improvement
of the legal profession throughout one’s career.” Id. at 139.
At another point in the conference, John O’Neill, Academic Program Coordinator for West
Publishing Co., in commenting on the enormous costs in both time and money imposed on stu-
dents by the existence of the bar exam, concluded that “[t]hese particular resources of cost and
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B.   Measurement Barriers
The state’s goal of ensuring minimum competence through administra-
tion of a bar examination also suffers from a significant measurement
problem. To the extent that the goal of the bar examination is accurately
to screen out those persons who are incompetent to practice law and cor-
rectly to identify those who are competent, at best the exam is a highly
imprecise measurement that may ultimately cost society more than benefit
it. In a study conducted by the New Mexico Supreme Court, one of the
expert witnesses identified two groups that the bar examination does not
detect particularly well.272 He described them as “false positives” and
“false negatives.”273
Utilizing a cost/benefit analysis,274 the expert described the results of a
study he conducted in an effort to measure the ability of the bar examina-
tion to distinguish between false positives and false negatives:
Hypothesizing, based on his expertise in testing, that the bar examina-
tion has a validity coefficient of .30, [he had] calculated that in a state
with a bar examination failure rate of 16 percent [84% passage rate],
the following would occur: 73 percent of the people sitting for the bar
examination would be correctly identified as being competent; 5 per-
cent would be correctly identified as being incompetent; 11 percent un-
qualified would pass; and 11 percent qualified would fail. If, however,
the pass rate were lowered to a 31 percent failure rate [69% passage
rate], the following happens: 61 percent of the bar candidates would be
correctly identified as being competent; 8 percent of those who take the
test will be accurately identified as incompetent; 8 percent will pass the
examination though they are incompetent; and 23 percent of the quali-
fied will fail the examination though they are competent to practice
law.275
 As a consequence of his study, Dr. Barrett demonstrated that by
changing the failure rate from 16% to 31% the identification of positive-
failures increased only slightly from 5% to 8%.276 However, the false-
negatives increased significantly from 11% to 23%, more than double.277
From this study, Dr. Barrett concluded that “whatever cost there is to
                                                                                                         
study time should be put toward programs that would improve a recent graduate’s competen-
cies in serving the needs of their clients. It is clear that the current Examination does not serve
this function.” Id. at 150.
272. Brown & Levay, supra note 245, at 9.
273. Id. Dr. Richard Barrett defined false negatives as “those who are unqualified yet pass
the examination” and false positives as “those who are qualified yet fail the bar.” Id. He also
identified two additional relevant categories as “those who are qualified to practice and pass
the bar, [and] those who are unqualified to practice and are failed by the bar examination.” Id.
274. Dr. Barrett described this form of analysis as “one of the most sophisticated concepts
in testing.” Id.
275. Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
276. Id.
277. Id.
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failing qualified people goes up very fast. Whatever benefit there is from
failing unqualified people is accrued only fairly slowly.”278
Clearly, excluding qualified applicants from the practice of law and
passing unqualified candidates imposes a very high cost on society. This
is especially true if a significant percentage of those who are qualified but
excluded are members of racial groups that in our society have been his-
torically underrepresented in the law.
 The most reasonable way to ensure that qualified applicants pass the
bar exam and, in effect, do not become “false negatives” is to apply a
very strict analysis to bar examinations. Such an analysis would put the
burden on the bar examiners to demonstrate, on an ongoing basis, that
their exams have been professionally validated as being maximally capa-
ble of identification and exclusion of the incompetent, while being mini-
mally susceptible to exclusion of the competent.279 Any bar examination
that failed to satisfy such standards would hardly be rationally related to
the state’s purpose and should, therefore, be held to be violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.280
V.   THE CAUSES AND SOURCES OF RACIALLY DISPARATE BAR
PERFORMANCE
A.   Educational Deficiencies
Fifteen years ago in Delgado v. McTighe,281 Judge Broderick observed
that the record of disproportionate bar failures by minorities “cries out for
an in-depth study to ascertain the reason.”282 However, both before and
since that time, very little effort has been devoted to discovering the rea-
sons for this disproportionality.283 Research that does exist in this area re-
veals one common conclusion. All of the studies agree that, among both
minority and white bar applicants, there is a significant correlation among
LSAT scores, law school grades, and bar passage rates.284
                                                                                                         
278. Id. at 10.
279. As suggested supra, notes 252-71 and accompanying text, this would involve a psy-
chometric evaluation of the bar examination to assure that it meets modern testing standards of
having predictive, content, and construct validity. Curiously, most state bar examiners and
courts considering the question have refused to hold the bar exam to these known standards of
validity.
280. Cf. Brown and Levay, supra note 245, at 14 (“The exclusion from practice of quali-
fied individuals, whether minority or majority culture, is too high a price to pay for adhering
to outmoded and superseded attorney licensing practices.”).
281. 522 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
282. Id. at 898 (referring to the disproportionately high failure rate of blacks taking the
Pennsylvania Bar Examination).
283. A significant exception to this trend is, of course, the current study being conducted
by the LSAC headed by Dean Ramsey. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
284. See, e.g., Stephen P. Klein, An Analysis of the Relationship Between Bar Examina-
tion Scores and an Applicant’s Law School Admissions Test Scores, Grades, Sex and Ra-
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As a consequence of this conclusion, the prevailing wisdom, as noted
in Delgado, is that “[t]he differences in the percentages failed will be
eliminated only when the blacks as a group, come to the examination as
well prepared as are the whites.”285 In short, many have blamed the causes
of disproportionate bar failure rates by minorities on the relatively poorer
educational preparation that minorities receive before entering law school.
As a result, proposed solutions to the disproportionate failure rate have
focused on the long range goal of improving the “educational pipeline”
through which minority students pass on the way to law school.286
B.   Socio-Psychological Factors
However, this long-range view fails to take into account the extent to
which “socio-psychological factors”287 may adversely affect the academic
performance of minority students, before and during law school and, ul-
timately, on the bar examination. The core of this socio-psychological
perspective is the self-concept288 of the minority student in the academic
environment and the extent to which it is either positive, and thereby em-
powering, or negative, and thereby disabling.289
                                                                                                         
cial/Ethnic Group, 49 B. EXAMINER 14, 16 (1980); Klein, Bar Examinations, supra note 4, at
30; Klein, On Testing, supra note 4, at 18, 19-20 (correlating the MBE and law school
grades); Brown & Levay, supra note 245, at 7 (correlating the MBE and law school grades);
KLEIN & BOLUS, supra note 3, at 10-15; Carlson & Werts, supra note 257, at 262.
285. Delgado, 522 F. Supp. at 894 (quoting the report of Dr. Robert Bernreuter, who was
retained by the Philadelphia Bar Association in 1972 to perform an analysis of the Pennsylva-
nia Bar Examination).
286. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS BAR REPORT, supra note 11, at 25. This process is re-
ferred to as “front loading the law schools with confident, motivated, intellectually stimulated
and prepared students.” Id. at 25-26.
287. Vaughns, supra note 3, at 431. Recent psychological studies have explored and
documented a positive, though not determinative, correlation between self-concept and aca-
demic achievement. Id. at 431-32 n.25 (citation omitted). As such, these “socio-psychological
factors . . . may, albeit indirectly, affect law school academic performance and bar exam per-
formance.” Id. at 431.
288. Bernadette M. Gadzella & James David Williamson, Study Skills, Self-Concept, and
Academic Achievement, 54 PSYCH. RPTS. 923, 932 (1984). “Self-concept” is a nonintellectual
factor that relates to a person’s perception of himself and the world around him, id.; self-
concept can impact on, among other things, that person’s academic achievement, id. at 927-28.
289. Jim Cummins, Empowering Minority Students, 56 HARV. EDUC. REV. 18, 21-22
(1986). Various types of learning environments promote the type of academic confidence nec-
essary for competitive academic achievement; students from “dominated” societal groups are
either “empowered” or “disabled," depending upon the quality of interaction received in the
educational setting. Id. at 21; see also Vaughns, supra note 3, at 460 (“Studies indicate stu-
dents of color succeed academically if they have a healthy sense of their own identity and self-
worth and feel positively towards the learning environment.”).
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1.   The Law School Experience
Students at all levels of education tend to perform at the level of the
expectations of authority figures around them, especially their teachers.290
Unfortunately, in law schools, all too many law school professors tend to
have low academic expectations for students of color291 and tend to com-
municate those expectations to both minority and white students in a
myriad of subtle, and not so subtle, ways.
The most obvious way that professors communicate their low expecta-
tions for minority students is by failing to call on students of color in the
classroom with any frequency. Similarly, when such students are called
on in class, their responses are frequently not probed very deeply, nor are
their answers followed up on in the general class discussion.292 These
patterns of behavior quickly and clearly communicate a message to the
entire class about the extent to which the professor values the voices,
contributions, perspectives, and academic ability of minority students.293
During my first year as a law professor, a white colleague told me that
he was very sympathetic to the plight of minority students in law school.
As evidence of this sympathy, he told me that it was his practice not to
call on minority students at all in class in order to spare them from the
embarrassment and humiliation attendant upon speaking in class. While
that professor was obviously motivated by what he perceived to be posi-
tive, sympathetic motives, implicit in his comment was an assumption re-
garding the inability of minority students to contribute to the class discus-
sion if called upon. Or, at the very least, his comments reflected a per-
ception that minority students would be more fragile and thus more nega-
tively impacted than white students by the normal experience of speaking
in class.
                                                                                                         
290. Cf. Jay M. Feinman & Marc Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning in
Legal Education, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 528, 531 (1985) (“[A] large body of research and years
of experience demonstrat[e] that widely distributed learning outcomes are more a product of
ineffective schooling than of the abilities of the students.”); see also RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, infra note 307, at 99.
291. See Vaughns, supra note 3, at 429. Professor Vaughns notes that, “given the large
differential in the traditional law school predictors, law faculty tend to make negative assump-
tions about the potential of students of color, specially admitted, to perform well in law
school.” Id. “[Feinman and Feldman] note that most law students possess the basic prerequi-
sites for learning the law. But for minority students admitted under affirmative action pro-
grams, they opine that many teachers reject this proposition, asserting that a significant num-
ber of law students are so deficient in ability or preparation that efforts to improve their aca-
demic performance significantly are infeasible.” Id. n.15 (analyzing Feinman & Feldman, su-
pra note 290, at 531 n.10). Since the faculty cannot distinguish between students of color who
were “specially admitted” and those who were not, I suggest that, in practice, many law pro-
fessors assume that all students of color, regardless of their academic credentials and prepara-
tion, were so admitted, and consequently the faculty entertain and communicate their low aca-
demic expectations indiscriminately with respect to all minority students.
292. See infra part V.B.1-4.
293. See infra part V.B.3.
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Quite honestly, I was stunned by my colleague’s admission. It seemed
clear to me that he had no idea how demeaning and presumptive his
comments were about his minority students’ abilities. I asked him what he
did when a minority student raised his hand to volunteer. His response
was that they never did!294
By refusing to call on minority students in class, my colleague was
summoning up within them the memories of the years when they had been
held back. They were no doubt reminded of elementary and secondary
school where they were similarly excluded from the dynamic of class-
room discussion.295 As a result, it came as no surprise to me that minority
                                                                                                         
294. Reflecting on that conversation, I was reminded of the parable of the elephant, the
chain, and the rope: A small child and her father went to a local circus. Entering the bigtop,
the child was particularly awestruck by the many enormous, powerful elephants that appeared
to be held in check by nothing more than a short, thin piece of ordinary rope wrapped around
one of the elephant’s huge hind legs and fastened to a small metal stake in the ground. The
child, fascinated by this simple and seemingly inadequate restraint on such powerful beasts,
asked her father how such a big, strong animal could be held down by such a small rope.
Equally perplexed, her father in turn asked the same question of the elephant’s trainer.
“Well,” the trainer responded, “we get that question all the time. It’s really quite simple.” The
trainer explained that when the elephants were still quite young, and not yet so strong, the
trainers put huge, powerful chains on their legs and anchored the chains to the biggest, strong-
est things around, such as a big tree or a truck. When the young elephants struggled to get
free, they were held fast by the big chains and strong anchors.
As the little elephant grew, the trainers used smaller and smaller chains, and less and less
formidable anchors. By the time the elephants had become full-grown, the chains had been re-
duced to nothing more than a small rope attached to a metal spike in the ground. In that way,
the trainer explained, each elephant, remembering the chains of its youth, associated the feel-
ing of the rope on its leg with the feeling of the chains, and by then it was so convinced in its
own mind that it could not break free, it did not even try anymore. “So you see,” concluded
the trainer, “the rope is not really holding the elephant back; it’s just a reminder. The elephant
is holding itself back. In fact,” added the trainer, “this system works so well, that sometimes
all we have to do is show the elephant the rope and it settles right down and doesn’t give us
any trouble at all.”
I could not help but think of my colleague’s minority students as being in a situation analo-
gous to that of the elephants in the parable.
295. Cf. Harold B. Gerard, School Desegregation: The Social Science Role, 38 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 869, 874 (1983).
There are fairly consistent findings that teachers pay more attention to white than to
minority pupils. . . . [T]here is also evidence that teachers underrate minority chil-
dren. In our own data we found that teachers who tend to undervalue the achieve-
ment of minority pupils as compared with whites—and most teachers do—tend to
have an adverse affect on the performance of minority children in their classes.
Id.; see also Ralph Scott, Gender and Race Achievement Profiles of Black and White Third-
Grade Students, 121 J. PSYCH. 629, 634 (1987).
Test scores often mirror empirical shortcomings, including validity and reliability
questions. Nonetheless, the extensive range of the subjects’ attainments on the CAT
[California Achievement Test] seemingly serve notice that individualized curricular
planning [that] enabl[es] students to become actively engaged in classroom activities
through frequent and accurate responses to stimuli relevant to classroom tasks . . .
may be required if compensatory programs are to provide many poor and minority
youth with viable schooling enrichment.
Id. (citations omitted).
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students did not volunteer to speak in his class. Unwittingly, he had sent
them a message; they had heard it and reacted accordingly.296
Minority students who find themselves in a law school environment
where they are suspected, rather than respected, by their professors may
reasonably feel alienated.297 That sense of alienation can have a negative
                                                                                                         
296. See Vaughns, supra note 3, at 458. The author observes that “students of color also
bring a sense of low self-esteem which is difficult to overcome when they encounter overt or
subtle treatment in a law school classroom that further undermines their self-confidence.
Whether or not the instructor is well-intentioned, students of color may harbor debilitating re-
sentment or perform less well if they perceive their treatment in the classroom as an indication
that they are less able than their white counterparts.” Id. at 458-59 (citing Gerard, supra note
295, at 874 (discussing data, in the context of studying the effects of desegregation, that dem-
onstrates a tendency on the part of classroom teachers to underrate minority students, with
consequences that adversely affect their performance in the classroom)).
I have a rather vivid memory of a similar incident when I was in the third grade. I was one
of only a handful of children of color in the class. The class had been asked to write essays on
what we saw in our minds when we daydreamed and to read those essays aloud to the rest of
the class. When my turn came, I read my essay and told, in my own visually descriptive way,
of seeing a beautiful meadow with bright flowers, a babbling brook, colorful birds, and a
beautiful blue sky. When I was done, I looked around. The class was absolutely silent. Think-
ing that I had done a good job, I looked up to the teacher for approval. She stared at me with a
stern and disapproving look that I will never forget and asked, “What book did you copy that
out of?” No matter how I tried to assure her that I had not copied it but had written it myself,
she insisted that it was “impossible” for it to be my own original work. She then launched into
a stern lecture to the entire class about the sin of copying things out of books rather than doing
one’s own work and used me as an example.
I was humiliated by that experience and branded as a cheater by my teacher and my class-
mates for the rest of the year! I never spoke again in that class. Soon afterwards, I developed a
serious stuttering problem that I struggle against to this day. It was years before I wrote an-
other essay for a teacher and, when I did, I was careful to make it plain and simple so as to
avoid any attention or suspicion.
The noted African-American playwright August Wilson, author of such works as Fences and
The Piano and recipient of numerous Tony Awards and a Pulitzer Prize, responded similarly
when asked why he had not finished high school. Charlie Rose (PBS television broadcast, Feb.
18, 1994). Because no one believed that he had actually written the things he produced, he was
the object of much suspicion and harassment. Id. For him, it was the choice between writing or
staying in school. Id. He chose writing.
297. Professors are not the only ones who foster this sense of being “suspected” rather
than “respected.” To the extent that some professors communicate a suspicion and low expec-
tation in the classroom, some white students often will adopt their professors’ attitude and treat
the minority students in the same fashion. In fact, to the extent that white students harbor inde-
pendent suspicions of their own regarding the intellectual capacity and qualifications of minor-
ity students to be in law school, they may well see in these professors’ attitudes an implicit
ratification of their own negative presumptions.
A few years ago I had one black student and one wheelchair-bound student in a large first-
year course. I emphasized the importance of not attempting to grapple with the demands of law
school alone and strongly encouraged the students to form study groups. Several weeks into
the course the black student and the wheelchair-bound student came to my office and informed
me that, despite their vigorous efforts, they had been unable to get into any study groups. Or,
as they put it, they couldn’t even “buy their way into a study group.” I reassured them that
there couldn’t be anything personal involved since it was so early in the first semester no one
in class really knew anyone yet. I asked them to be patient and trust that I would do something
to help them. During the next several weeks, I highlighted those two students in my class and
called on them repeatedly, probing deeply and following up extensively. They rose to the
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impact on their ability to learn and achieve in the classroom. One scholar
writing about this process of alienation has observed that “[i]f students are
in an environment in which they feel that the instructor does not value
their contributions or behaves in a manner that is insensitive or demean-
ing, whether it be well intentioned or otherwise, such an environment
may adversely affect the learning experience.”298
In this environment, minority law students, although admitted and
registered as any other student, are not treated as legitimate members of
the law school community. Instead, they are treated as guests in another’s
house—provided with all of the superficial courtesies of a guest who is
told, “Make yourself at home,” while made to feel the clear, but unspo-
ken, subtext: “Don’t get too comfortable; hurry up and leave soon; but,
above all, do not forget that this is really our house, not yours!”
2.   A Hostile Learning Environment for Students of Color
Being continually treated as a guest in another’s house can create what
reasonably may be described as an adverse, and possibly even hostile,
learning environment. At the core of this racially hostile environment in
America’s law schools, there still exist “lingering perceptions that Afri-
can-Americans (and presumably other minorities) are inherently infe-
rior.”299 America has a long and shameful history of racial discrimination
against black people. Much of that discrimination was based on a
“scientific” racism300 that purported to prove through the “general phi-
losophy of biological determinism . . . [that] hierarchies of advantage and
disadvantage follow the dictates of nature; stratification reflects biol-
                                                                                                         
challenge and performed extremely well in these class discussions. I then frequently spoke
about them and their excellent classroom contributions to my colleagues who taught other first-
year courses in my section. As a consequence, I heard that they were being called on fre-
quently in one or two other classes as well. Within a few weeks, they came back to my office
and told me that they had now received a great many invitations to join study groups—some
from one or two of the so-called “best groups in the class.” As they put it, “[W]e now have to
beat them off with a stick.” At the end of the year, both students finished academically in the
top 10% of the class.
298. Vaughns, supra note 3, at 432. The author also notes that “[t]o the extent that stu-
dents feel inferior and alienated in the classroom setting, they are discouraged and, therefore,
may perform less well or as ‘expected’.” Id. at 460. By performing “as expected,” the author
is referring to data that suggest that students tend to perform according to the expectations of
the authority figures around them, especially teachers. See Feinman & Feldman, supra note
290, at 531. Therefore, as the saying goes, the students will live either “up to” or “down to”
the expectations that are powerfully communicated to them.
299. Vaughns, supra note 3, at 458 (citing Richard Delgado et al., Can Science Be Inop-
portune? Constitutional Validity of Government Restrictions on Race-I.Q. Research, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 128, 194 (1983) (discussing the controversy surrounding race-based theories of inferi-
ority and psychological injury to African-American children)).
300. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 80 (1981).
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ogy.”301 As recently as 1964, the eighteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia
Britannica described the characteristics of black people as having “ ‘a
small brain in relation to their size,’ along with woolly hair.”302
  To be sure, as a nation we have come a long way since 1964. How-
ever, it has been perceptively observed that “[f]ew will deny that the ra-
cial equality goals that a few decades ago seemed in sight are now further
away than ever. . . . Equality, experience tells us, did not follow the en-
actment of civil rights laws or victories in the courts.”303 Instead of elimi-
nating racial discrimination, in many cases much of the civil rights legis-
lation has done no more than to drive discrimination “underground, where
it flourishes even more effectively.”304 The presumption of incompetence,
                                                                                                         
301. Id. The author states that “scientific racists and sexists often confine their label of in-
feriority to a single disadvantaged group; but race, sex, and class go together, and each acts as
a surrogate for the others.” Id.
302. Id. at 111. If my own experience is any guide, many blacks and whites in the current
generation of lawyers, judges, and law professors grew up with this type of “scientific” infor-
mation being taught to them in school as fact!
303. DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY 148 (1994). Professor Bell argues that
since the time, just a few decades ago, when we thought so much good was about to be ac-
complished, “the plight of the poor and the disadvantaged is not much eased by social pro-
grams, which no matter how ambitiously undertaken, seem able to deliver only food without
nutrition, welfare without well-being, job training without employment opportunities, and legal
services without justice.” Id.
304. Id. at 149. Witness the reactions to the O.J. Simpson verdict and the Million Man
March. See generally Abigail Thernstrom, Two Nations, Separate and Hostile, N.Y. TIMES,
October 12, 1995, at A23 (describing a “white backlash” to affirmative action, the O.J. Simp-
son verdict, and the Million Man March).
Bell and Thernstrom are suggesting that in the post-civil rights era most overt signs of racial
discrimination have disappeared. Gone are the “whites only” signs in public places. However,
what remains are the feelings of white superiority and black inferiority that provided the intel-
lectual foundation for our national segregationist system in the first instance. As a conse-
quence, whites who still feel that blacks are inherently inferior, but who are no longer free to
express such views openly without fears of at least social, if not outright legal, sanction, have
turned to more subtle, or underground, ways to express their views. Examples of this more
subtle or underground racism are many and varied. They range from the deep racial divide ex-
posed following the not guilty verdict in the infamous O.J. Simpson case, to the persistence of
racial discrimination in mortgage lending and rental housing, to the increasingly heated na-
tional debate over affirmative action, to the debate over the great disparities in sentencing for
possession of crack, versus powder, cocaine. Andrew Hacker, for example, eloquently dis-
cusses this more subtle, but continuing, legacy of racism in the recently published, expanded
version of his famous book Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal. Writ-
ing about the continuing resistance of whites to integrated housing, Hacker states:
To the minds of most Americans, the mere presence of black people is associated
with a high incidence of crime, residential deterioration, and lower educational at-
tainment. Of course, most whites are willing to acknowledge that these strictures do
not apply to all blacks. At the same time, they do not want to have to worry about
trying to distinguish blacks who would make good neighbors those who would not.
To which is added the suspicion that if more black families arrive, it would take only
one or two undesirables to undermine any interracial amity. . . .
Americans have extraordinarily sensitive antennae for the coloration of neighbor-
hoods. In virtually every metropolitan area, white householders can rank each en-
clave by the racial makeup of the residents. Given this knowledge, where a family
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which many law professors and law students have regarding minority law
students, provides a vivid and pernicious example of this “underground
racism.” 305 As we have seen, “expectation is a powerful guide to ac-
tion.”306 The power of such expectations is particularly strong in the
teacher-student relationship. In a report analyzing racial isolation in pub-
lic schools, the United States Commission on Civil Rights described the
well-documented power of such expectations in an educational context by
observing that
studies have highlighted the effect of teacher expectations on student
performance. In one study, teachers were told that certain students,
who actually had been selected at random, had especially high ability.
As a result, their own expectations for those students rose and the stu-
dents’ performance markedly improved. It seems likely that a similar
relationship exists for student attitudes. Indeed, some studies suggest
that students tend to adjust to what they perceive their teachers’ expec-
tations to be and to aspire and perform accordingly.307
Such presumptions and expectations by law professors generally, but
particularly with respect to minority students, can be especially damag-
ing.308 The “influence of law professors extends well beyond the class-
room. . . . [They] are both the gatekeepers and molders of the profes-
sion.”309 As a result, to the extent that they conduct themselves with in-
sensitivity310 in the classroom and act like “Hessian-trainer[s]”311 with
                                                                                                         
lives becomes an index of its social standing. While this is largely an economic mat-
ter, proximity to blacks compounds this assessment. For a white family to be seen as
living in a mixed--or changing--neighborhood can be construed as a symptom of sur-
render, indeed as evidence that they are on a downward spiral.
If you are black, these white reactions brand you as a carrier of contaminations. No
matter what your talents or attainments, you are seen as infecting a neighborhood
simply because of your race. . . . It opens wounds that never really heal and leaves
scars to remind you how far you stand from full citizenship.
ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 43
(1995).
305. GOULD, supra note 300, at 65.
306. Id.
307. 1 RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, A REPORT TO THE U.S. COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS 99 (1967) (citations omitted).
308. These negative presumptions and expectations need not be, and most often probably
are not, conscious and deliberate. Rather they are the unconscious products of living in a soci-
ety steeped in negative and stereotypical images of minorities and women. See generally
Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
309. Robert J. Borthwick & Jordan R. Schau, Gatekeepers of the Profession: An Empirical
Profile of the Nation’s Law Professors, 25 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 191, 193 (1991). The authors
emphasize that “[t]oday, the role of law professor includes control over the only training ex-
perience common to all members of the legal profession: attendance at law school.” Id.
310. A vivid, if perhaps somewhat dated, example of such pedagogic insensitivity, was
related by Professor Bell, supra note 303, at 16. Bell tells a story about being warned by a re-
cent black graduate of his law school about a property teacher who every year would illustrate
the concepts of trespass and adverse possession with a hypothetical about a “Negro sneaking
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“arrogance transformed into a pedagogical device,”312 many minorities
(and women) will continue to disengage and become alienated from the
learning process. This alienation cannot help but have a direct and nega-
tive effect on students’ academic performance as well as their internal
perceptions of intellectual self-worth and confidence. More importantly,
majority male students, learning from their professor’s example, will
carry those negative presumptions and expectations with them into their
practice of law, and the same will affect their interactions with clients,
colleagues, judges, staff, and applicants for jobs.
3.   A Hostile Learning Environment for Women
The sense that the law school classroom may be a hostile learning en-
vironment for students of color also appears to apply to women.313 In a
comprehensive study of the graduating class of 1989, Suzanne Homer and
Lois Schwartz discovered that most of the women “convey[ed] an overrid-
ing sense of isolation and dissatisfaction with what they perceive[d] as a
hostile legal educational system.”314 Moreover, their study revealed that
these feelings were “not limited to women who were having social or
academic difficulties in law school. Women who were ‘performing well’
often expressed the same feelings.”315
                                                                                                         
late at night into a watermelon patch.” Id. Professor Bell’s mentor told him not to protest when
the story was told, but rather to sit quietly and take it. Id. The property professor did tell the
story and Bell did not protest. Id. Perhaps Bell’s current criticism of Harvard Law School is,
in some small part, a result of the pent-up frustration borne from remaining quiet during his
property professor’s insulting and demeaning story.
More contemporaneously, I recently had a number of black students come to my office to
complain about a white colleague, who, in teaching a class on professional ethics, created a
hypothetical involving a black man raping a white woman. When the students asked him what
the relevance of the race of the perpetrator and the victim was, he told them that their respec-
tive races were not relevant at all and to disregard them in framing their response to the ethical
problem presented. Their question to me was, if race was irrelevant, then why was it included
in the facts? I had no answer for them except to applaud their having brought it to the profes-
sor’s attention, rather than just sitting quietly and taking it.
311. Borthwick & Schau, supra note 309, at 196.
312. Michael H. Levin, Fear and Loathing at Harvard Law School, HARVARD MAGAZINE,
Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 44, 46.
313. See Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an
Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (1989-90). These observations
are equally as true with respect to women as they are for students of color. Women in law
schools tend to report feelings of isolation, alienation, and of being suspected and not respected
in much the same ways as students of color. Clearly, “women of color” in law school bear the
heaviest burden of all in this respect because of the intersection of gender and race. See id. at 8
(discussing a study conducted at Yale Law School from 1984 to 1987, in which women de-
scribed their feelings of alienation in legal education as “a process of ‘self extrication,’ or the
rigorous exclusion of feelings and personal beliefs”); see generally Taunya Lovell Banks,
Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 SO. ILL. L.J. 527 (1990).
314. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 313, at 5.
315. Id. at 4; see also Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty
Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1330 (1988).
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Their sense of isolation and dissatisfaction was based in large measure
on what they described as the dominant white male model of the structure
of legal education.316 Catherine Weiss and Louise Melling identified the
same structural and institutional source of women’s isolation:
We increasingly saw ourselves as women in a white male community.
The environment reminded us and our men-peers that the profession
did not yet reflect women’s presence. . . .
The physical environment made us feel both invisible, images of
women noticeably absent, and conspicuous, incapable of camouflage.
Entirely absent were images of women and men of color. These sur-
roundings kept us distrustful, reminding us that the institution that
admitted us had traditionally denied entrance to women and people of
color. The pictures, the furniture, the male professors—all indicated
that the place had always belonged to white men.317
One of the most significant ways in which women’s sense of  isolation
is manifested is their silence in the classroom. Professor Guinier noted
that women described this process as “a dynamic in which [they] feel that
their voices were ‘stolen’ from them during their first year.”318 Similarly,
Weiss and Melling describe it as “[t]he drowning of women’s speech in a
flood of men’s voices.”319 This silencing process is apparently so perni-
cious that even women who had been active class participants in college
classes suddenly and startlingly fall mute in the law school classroom.320
Many women feel that the burden of silence in the law school class-
room falls most heavily on women of color:
[W]omen of color indicat[ed] that they participated less than any other
group. Strikingly, a majority of women and people of color indicated
that they never asked questions or volunteered answers in class, in
contrast to nearly two-thirds of white males who stated that they had
done both with some frequency. The data thus confirm what many of
us have experienced or observed as law students, and what has been
                                                                                                         
316. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 310, at 3.
317. Weiss & Melling, supra note 315, at 1322-23 (citation omitted); see generally Lani
Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 93 (1990-91). Upon re-
turning to Yale Law School ten years after her graduation, Guinier noticed “the traditional
portraits of larger-than-life white men,” Guinier, supra, at 93, and concluded that “the gigantic
male portraits symbolized my alienation as a student from class, race, and gender privilege.
Law school, as a professional school, was simply more homogeneous with even more explic-
itly homogenizing institutional norms . . . than I had either expected or previously experi-
enced.” Id. at 94 n.4; see also Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experi-
ences at One Ivy League School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1994).
318. Guinier et al., supra note 317, at 4.
319. Weiss & Melling, supra note 315, at 1302. The authors suggest that this alienation
process is particularly significant because it “affects the legal profession and everyone it
touches. What we do in law school shapes what we will do as lawyers, which in turn affects
the lives of others. Until women share equally in the learning and thus in the practice, teach-
ing, and making of law, we will be disabled in shaping society to fit women’s needs.” Id.
320. See id. at 1333.
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verified by every study which has addressed the issue. Although we are
present in increasing numbers in the classroom, we are present only to
listen and not to speak.321
In addition to the structural and institutional factors described by Pro-
fessor Guinier and others, Weiss and Melling have identified four addi-
tional and interrelated factors that contribute to the silencing of women in
the law school classroom. First, they suggest it is a consequence of the
hostility many professors and male students feel towards their presence.322
Second, they attribute it to the law school style of argumentation, which
they describe as a “generalized aggression” directed “against every per-
son and every issue.”323 Third, they describe “nonconversation,” a type of
classroom speech pattern in which primarily men speak only to demon-
strate their intellectual and verbal prowess, and no one listens or responds
to anyone else.324 Fourth, they describe a type of male showmanship en-
gendered by “classes dominated by argument or nonconversation.”325
The hostility felt by women in the law school classroom occasionally
manifests itself as “direct derogation of [their] minds and bodies” by their
male colleagues.326 More frequently, however, this hostility is the product
of “a kind of willful deafness toward what women-students say, accompa-
nied by an absence of eye contact, a physical turning away.”327 Whether
done by their male colleagues, their professors, or both, the insulting, ex-
cluding, or drowning out of women in the classroom  reflects great peda-
gogic insensitivity by the law professor. After all, it is the professor who is
primarily responsible for such behavior, either through active participation
or simply by not establishing a more disciplined classroom environment.
Unfortunately, in such hostile environments, classes “become a closed cir-
                                                                                                         
321. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 313, at 29 (citation omitted).
322. Weiss & Melling, supra note 315, at 1335 (citation omitted).
323. Id.
324. Id. Additionally, the authors describe this type of elitist and self-centered disconnec-
tion, a situation in which
[n]o one listened to each other. The teachers didn’t listen to the students. The students
didn’t listen to the teachers. The students didn’t listen to one another. There was no joint
project to learn something. In class, the teacher would say something. The student would
respond. The teacher’s response would have nothing to do with the student’s comments.
Id. at 1341.
325. Id. at 1335.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1336. One student reported:
There were times when women made points, and they were ignored or trivialized.
Five minutes later, a man would make the same point, in three parts, and it was dis-
cussed. I hated that . . . . We were interrupted or pounced on. . . . Some professors
. . . would always call on the men first when the men had their hands up, or they
would always call on all the men first and then call on the women . . . . The men
don’t raise their hands, they just speak out, and they’re very loud, and they just start
shouting over each other.
Id.
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cle of men [that is, some] women start to behave as if they weren’t there,
as if they didn’t deserve to participate as fully in their education as their
classmates.”328
Just like their classmates of color, as well as many other law students,
women who are being silenced and suffocated in the classroom pay a very
personal price in the form of “genuine and tremendous ‘psychic injury’” to
their self-esteem.329 In this respect, Homer and Schwartz found that “57%
of women of color, 50% of white women, and 41% of men of color agreed
that they no longer felt intelligent and articulate in law school, in vivid
comparison to only 25% of white men. . . . [L]oss of confidence was expe-
rienced by 43% of women of color, 36% of white women, 30% of men of
color, and only 19% of white men.”330 This pattern was so pervasive that
the study’s authors concluded that white men were having a vastly different
experience in law school “from the rest of us.”331 It is, therefore, not sur-
prising to find that with respect to grades in two first-year courses, the
study concluded that “women were not . . . performing as well as men, at
least in the critical first year.”332 No doubt this results at least partly from
the silencing, excluding, marginalizing, and ridiculing environment.
A recent study conducted by the Law School Admission Council (LSAC)
on the differences in the law school experiences of men and women con-
                                                                                                         
328. Id. at 1337. This atmosphere within the classroom is clearly within the professor’s
ability to control and change. More subtle and perhaps more destructive behavior occurs out-
side the classroom, where women who dare to attempt to participate in class are punished and
thereby silenced by both male and female colleagues who ridicule them based on “ideas about
women’s sexuality.” See Guinier at al., supra note 317, at 51 n.128. In this context, Professor
Guinier noted that
[o]ne woman student reported hearing negative comments about her frequent class
participation while in a stall in the women’s bathroom. Although married, she was
decried as a “man-hating lesbian.” She reports that she almost dropped out of law
school that day. Another woman reported that she was called a “feminazi dyke” for
her frequent comments in first-year classes. This student, who is Jewish, immedi-
ately stopped speaking in all her first-year classes. Still another woman said she felt
“like wherever I went [the hissing] would follow me. It really shut me up."
Id. Professor Guinier also observed that although these put downs occur outside of classes in
informal student relations, “they are normalized by and may reproduce behavior that is per-
formed within the classroom.” Id. at 52.
329. Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs Through It: Tapping into the Informational Stream
To Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 667, 671 (1994).
330. Homer & Schwartz, supra note 313, at 33.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 30. But see Janet Taber et al., Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profes-
sion: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209
(1988). In that study, the Stanford researchers
found no statistically significant difference in the number of men and women elected
to Order of the Coif. They extrapolate this finding to provide evidence that all men
and women at Stanford are performing comparably. . . . However, they do not con-
sider the fact that the top ten percent of the class elected to Order of the Coif is not
necessarily (or even logically) representative of the performance distribution among
men and women in the other 90%.
Homer & Schwartz, supra note 313, at 13.
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cluded there were “wide disparities in the experiences of men and women
after they entered law school.”333 Central in these disparities was the finding
that many women who overachieved in earlier stages of the academic
pipeline tended to perform less well than their male counterparts and re-
ceived lower grades in law school.
Although the LSAC study failed to identify definitively the underlying
causes for these disparities, its author, Dr. Linda F. Wightman, suggested
that the disparity was due primarily to what she termed a “chilly class-
room environment for women.”334 Moreover, she concluded that at least
part of the explanation for these gender-based disparities lay in the fact
that “women’s self-concept is being undermined”335 in classroom envi-
ronments that are cold and inconsistent “with their way of problem-
solving.”336 To this extent, the experiences of both women and people of
color are quite similar. The law school classroom is for both groups a
learning environment that is cold, alienating, hostile, and therefore differ-
ent from what affects their white male counterparts.
To the extent that performance on the bar exam is in any way corre-
lated to academic performance in law school, the psychic injury done to
women and students of color by being isolated and silenced in the class-
room reflects itself first in lower academic performance, then, predicta-
bly, in lower success rates on the bar exam. As a consequence, their aca-
demic performance, especially in the first year, is as much, if not more, a
function of such “isolation factors than traditional index numbers like
GPA’s and LSAT’s.”337
                                                                                                         
333. Ken Myers, Study of Gender Difference Finds 1-L Women Draw Lower Grades, THE
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 30, 1995, at A17.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. The study also revealed that even though women are receiving lower grades than
men, the evidence indicated that they are spending “a lot more time studying than men.” Id.
While the results of this study clearly indicate that a lot more work needs to be done to under-
stand fully what is going on in law school classrooms with respect to women and their self-
image, Dr. Wightman concludes that, “We are learning that women are coming out of that
first year of law school with a very different self-concept than men are.” Id.
337. Roach, supra note 329, at 676. Dean Roach goes on to observe that those who are
generally described as outsiders, which includes minorities and women (especially if they are
older),
experience increased isolation with resulting increased psychological and academic
hardships. . . . [S]tudies report that a typical behavioral response to this isolation is
increased passivity and non-assertive behavior, including asking fewer questions of
faculty members. In turn, this passivity clearly affects grade point averages. . . .
[A]cademic self-concept, rather than the traditional cognitive skills, is a significant
predictor of academic success.
Id. at 677 (citation omitted).
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4.   Academic Support Programs and Stigmatization
Another source of the low self-image that afflicts minority law students
and women is the existence of potentially stigmatizing academic support
programs.338 Although not all law schools have special academic support
programs for minority students, the vast majority do, in one form or an-
other.339 Despite the apparently altruistic motives of such programs, the
implicit message that “support programs relay to minority students is not
encouragement and empowerment; the message is incompetence and the
predictive certainty of failure.”340
Almost without exception, law school academic support programs se-
lect students to participate on the basis of such “objective criteria” as low
Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) scores and undergraduate grade
point averages (UGPAs).341 Most academic support programs do not ex-
plicitly select students to participate on the basis of race. However, since
minority students enter law school with relatively lower statistical predic-
tors, such as LSAT scores and UGPAs, they comprise a highly visible
and disproportionate percentage of students who are either invited or re-
quired to participate in these programs. As a consequence, even before
these minority students attend their first law school class, by having been
selected to participate in one of these programs, they have received an
implicit message from the law school that says, “You are going to have
problems.”342 This message can be particularly negative because, with
                                                                                                         
338. See generally Leslie G. Espinoza, Empowerment and Achievement in Minority Law
Student Support Programs: Constructing Affirmative Action, 22 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 281
(1989) (describing the systemic inadequacy of most academic support programs). Espinoza ar-
gues that because the law schools that employ such programs do not understand the counter-
productive psychological damage that they inflict on minority students, such programs will
never succeed unless they are properly restructured. Id. at 286-92.
339.  See id. Espinoza notes that in a 1988 report issued by the Minority Affairs Commit-
tee of the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC), of 128 schools that responded to the
LSAC questionnaire, “81 law schools have a minority recruitment program, 51 have a summer
orientation program, 59 have a tutorial program, 32 have a legal writing program and 58 have
other special programs for minority students.” Id. at 281, n.4. (citing LAW SCHOOL AD-
MISSION COUNCIL MINORITY AFFAIRS COMM., SUMMARY REPORT ON THE LSAC QUES-
TIONNAIRE ON SPECIAL LAW SCHOOL PROGRAMS FOR MINORITY STUDENTS 5 (1988)).
340. Id. at 282; see also Stephen R. Ripps, A Curriculum Course Designed for Lowering
the Attrition Rate for the Disadvantaged Law Student, 29 HOW. L.J. 457, 462 (1986) (noting
that “classification of minority students into a collective, homogeneous body, funneled into
segregated remedial classes branded these students as different and caused their failure to fully
integrate on campus”); Roach, supra note 329, at 675 (“[A] ‘message of incompetence’ or
failure can be telegraphed to the student in a myriad of ways, including actions by professors
who have lower expectations of minority students. In short, it seems apparent that minority
student isolation may be more extreme than that of traditional law students, with far-reaching
effects on self-esteem and motivation.”).
341. Espinoza, supra note 338, at 286-89.
342. Id. at 288.
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rare exception, the structure and focus of these special support programs
is remedial in nature.343
By sending such a negative message to the minority student and the
whole law school community, law schools stigmatize minority students.
Such stigmatization has the counterproductive effect of “damag[ing] the
students’ self-expectations . . . [and] creat[ing] self-doubt in the minority
student,”344 effects which surely undermine the potential effectiveness of
the programs. With this burden placed upon them from the beginning of
their law studies, minority students have tended to adopt an attitude of
survival over one of achievement.345
As a result, many minority students labor under a type of numbing
pessimism and self-doubt, reinforced by their professors, their majority
counterparts, and the law school administration. This self-doubt often
manifests itself in the form of marginalization and disengagement from
the learning process, poor preparation, and, ultimately, poor perform-
ance. The manifest expectation of failure becomes a type of self-fulfilling
prophecy—feeding upon itself with distressing and devastating results.
Unlike the “little engine that could,” which surmounted its challenges by
reciting the mantra “I think I can, I think I can,” minority law students,
suffering under the stigmatizing badge of a special and “remedial” sup-
port program, must struggle mightily against an official chorus that bel-
lows at every turn, “We don’t think you can, we don’t think you can.”
These unreasonable burdens make the plight of the minority law student
who fails all the more tragic and the success of the minority law student
who excels all the more worthy of praise and admiration. The bitter irony
is that an academic support program does not have to be remedial in focus
and, therefore, stigmatizing in result. It is quite possible to design, struc-
ture, and implement an academic support program that is empowering and
challenging in both tone and content. Such programs tend to build minor-
ity students up, rather than to weigh them down.346
                                                                                                         
343. Id. at 290.
344. Id. at 289.
345. See generally Nerissa Bailey-Scott Skillman, Misperceptions Which Operate as Barri-
ers to the Education of Minority Law Students, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 553, 554 (1986). Skillman
points out that the primary misperception that operates as a barrier to the education of minority
law students is that both “faculty and students often misperceive the academic standard for mi-
nority students as being one of survival, rather than excellence. . . . Psychological studies have
shown over and over again that a subject’s level of achievement will be determined by the ex-
perimenter’s articulation of the standard to be achieved.” Id.
346. See infra part VI, discussing the concept of “wise schooling.” At my own law school,
Touro Law Center in Huntington, New York, we have discovered that by creating an academic
support program for all minority students, without regard to statistical indicators, and involv-
ing active participation of minority law professors and successful upper-class minority students
as teaching assistants, the sense of stigma is significantly reduced and the sense of empower-
ment is greatly enhanced.
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5.   The Power of Law School Grades
Unfortunately, within the law school culture, grades matter all too
much and exert a pervasive, and sometimes devaluing, power. Ideally,
grades should simply be a reflection of academic performance in particu-
lar courses at particular times. Instead, they have taken on the signifi-
cance of being the ultimate metaphysical measure of a student’s intelli-
gence and personal value.347 This emphasis on grades has particularly
devastating effects on both minority and majority law students.
In a recent article appearing in the Harvard Alumni Magazine, a sur-
vey of the Harvard Law School reunion class of 1969 indicated that due to
the law school’s “ ‘scarifying emphasis on grades . . . men of outstanding
undergraduate attainment, Rhodes scholars and junior Phi Betes, let me-
diocre grades in law school convince them that they were mediocre
men.’”348
If a law school’s “scarifying emphasis on grades” can have this effect
on the best and the brightest of privileged majority males, who have had
every academic reinforcement of their intellectual worth, it is hardly sur-
prising that minority students, many from difficult economic and educa-
tional backgrounds, would suffer even more under the weight of this bur-
den. As a consequence, minority law students, who are not performing
well academically and who are already numbed by the ambient chorus of
intellectual suspicion, see their low grades as a measure of their intelli-
gence rather than their performance.
Predictably, for minority law students, low first-year grades can es-
tablish a self-reinforcing negative expectation of failure that feeds on itself
in a familiar pattern of self-fulfilling prophesy. In addition, such grade
patterns and the expectations that they engender contribute mightily to the
prevailing mindset of survival rather than excellence349—law school is
perceived as an adverse, perhaps even hostile, learning environment,
where minority students’ prospects are survival at best, failure at worst.
As a result, like the elephants in the child’s parable,350 many minority law
students continue holding themselves back, failing to succeed, and fearing
to take the risk of committing themselves fully to the maximum effort re-
quired to excel.351
                                                                                                         
347. See Skillman, supra note 345, at 556.
348. Levin, supra note 312, at 47 (quoting Dr. David Reisman, Harvard law class of
1934).
349. Espinoza, supra note 338, at 289.
350. See supra note 294.
351. See Espinoza, supra note 338, at 289 n.33 (citing Portia Y. T. Hamlar, Minority To-
kenism in American Law Schools, 26 HOW. L.J. 443, 536 (1979) (discussing the LSAT’s ef-
fect, Hamlar cites a Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) study,
which notes that “lack of confidence can be a dominant cause of a student’s academic prob-
lems”)).
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6.   Effects on Bar Exam Performance
Coming out of the hostile learning environment of a law school that
doubts their intellectual value and tells them so in many subtle, and not so
subtle, ways, minority law students then face the bar exam with the anec-
dotal knowledge that students of color fail on their first attempt in dispro-
portionate numbers. So pervasive is this expectation of failure that it is a
matter of common belief among many minority law students that, for
them, the first administration is for practice and passing comes later, on
their second or third attempt.352
However, the student’s focus on the eventual passage rate of minorities
is misplaced. This is because the very data used to demonstrate the rela-
tive parity of the eventual passage rates between minority and majority
candidates also discloses that “minority applicants who fail the exam on
the first attempt disproportionately do not sit for the examination
again.”353
 Consequently, although eventual passage rates may be relatively equal
between minority and majority candidates, the rates reflect the ultimate
success of only a fraction of the minority candidates who initially took the
bar exam. Clearly, focusing on the eventual passage rates is misleading
and understates the adverse racial impact of the examination.354 Perma-
nently losing so many promising and potentially qualified minority appli-
cants because of a seriously flawed examination has a serious effect on the
profession and the public interest.
Because so many minority law students focus on the expectation of
failure on their first attempt and eventual passage later on, predictably,
the self-fulfilling prophecy is fulfilled, at least on their first attempt, with
all too great frequency. But approaching the bar examination with a psy-
chological expectation of failure is not an inherent function of being a mi-
                                                                                                         
352. This view has been fueled by reports that suggest that the real or eventual bar passage
rates for minorities is “twice their initial rate. . . . Thus, there was only a 2 to 3 percentage
point difference between the minority group’s share of the test taking population and their
share of those licensed to practice.” Klein, supra note 4, at 30. Similarly, the New York State
Board of Law Examiners, in a letter to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, re-
sponding to that Association’s report on admission to the bar in New York, concluded that “
‘eventual pass rates’ of minority and majority candidates ‘demonstrate access by minorities to
the profession’ and that the bar examination is not a differential deterrent to becoming a law-
yer.” See REPORT ON ADMISSION TO THE BAR IN NEW YORK, supra note 6, at 14 (citation
omitted).
353. Maurice Emsellem & Richard S. Barrett, The Bar Examination Debate (Continued),
16 T. Marshall L. Rev. 531, 534 (1991) (quoting YAMAKI ET AL., supra note 6, at 5)
(emphasis added).
354. YAMAKI ET AL., supra note 6, at 5. The Yamaki report indicated that the eventual
passage rate for the whole pool of African-American applicants remained (at least in Califor-
nia) at 48%, versus 84% for nonminorities. Id. Furthermore, the failure rates of retakers was
39% for African-Americans, versus 11% for nonminorities. Id.; see also Emsellem & Barrett,
supra note 353, at 534.
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nority in America. Rather, it is the reasonable and foreseeable conse-
quence of a law school learning environment that tends, from its very
beginning, to grind down and devalue the minority candidate’s sense of
self-esteem, self-worth, and self-confidence. That education has taught the
minority student the law, along with deeper and more ominous lessons
that only intensify the internal wounds that are the legacy of growing up
as a person of color in America.355 Tragically, for too many law students
of color, law school teaches self-doubt and to hold oneself back—to ex-
pend less and to expect less.356
                                                                                                         
355. See generally BELL, supra note 303, at 154 (“Of all the injuries inflicted by racism on
people of color, the most corrosive is the wound within, the internalized racism that leads
some victims, at unspeakable cost to their own sense of self, to embrace the values of their op-
pressors.”) (citations omitted); see also ARTHUR ASHE & ARNOLD RAMPERSAD, DAYS OF
GRACE: A MEMOIR 127-28 (1993). Therein, Arthur Ashe poignantly confesses that
segregation had achieved by that time what it was intended to achieve: it left me a
marked man, forever aware of a shadow of contempt that lay across my identity and
my sense of self-esteem. Subtly the shadow falls on my reputation, the way I know I
am perceived; the mere memory of it darkens my most sunny days. I believe that the
same is true for almost every African-American of the slightest sensitivity and intel-
ligence. . . . I don’t want to overstate the case. I think of myself, and others think of
me, as supremely self-confident. . . . Still, I also know that the shadow is always
there; only death will free me, and blacks like me, from its pall.
ASHE & RAMPERSAD, supra, at 127-28. Clearly, if Arthur Ashe, a man who achieved brilliant
and unparalleled success in an arena that had been traditionally barred to black people, felt a
“shadow of contempt” from which only death could free him, minority law students in a hos-
tile learning environment may also feel the weight of that “shadow”.
356. These lessons are exacerbated by the shocking dearth of minority law professors in
our nation’s law schools. See Espinoza, supra note 338, at 292-93. The absence of minority
faculty only serves to reinforce the minority law student’s impression that law is a “white
man’s world,” in which it is difficult to see minorities participating as full members. See id.
The presence of minority faculty, in more than token numbers, provides
concrete role models for minority law students. They dispel the myth of preordained
mediocrity for minorities. . . . Minority faculty, though they may be marginalized
and undermined by some, do represent power. Statistically, their presence means a
higher retention of minority students. Their perceived accessibility creates a resource
for advice and support. Minority faculty inspire confidence by their example; they
provide perspective by their shared cultural experience.
Id. at 293. (citing, inter alia, Skillman, supra note 345, at 532 (stating that the “study found
that the presence of minority faculty had a positive (statistically significant) relationship upon
the retention rate of first-year black students”)).
In addition, Professor Espinoza observed, “There is indeed a woefully inadequate number of
minority law professors. The recent Society of American Law Teaching (SALT) study found
that twenty-eight law schools have no minority faculty, thirty-two have only one, twenty have
only two, and only fourteen law schools (excluding historically black schools) have more than
two minority faculty.” Espinoza, supra note 338, at 290 (citing Charles R. Lawrence III, Mi-
nority Hiring in AALS Law Schools: The Need for Voluntary Quotas, 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 429,
441 (1986)).
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VI.   A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
RACIALLY DISPARATE BAR PERFORMANCE
Improving the quality of the educational preparation of minority law
school applicants, as some have suggested, is certainly a desirable goal.
However, it should be pursued for its own sake and not as a solution to
the problem of racially disparate bar performance. Current law school
applicants, and later bar exam candidates, are perfectly capable of meet-
ing the challenge of excelling in law school and passing the bar if their
law school learning environment is significantly improved. By significant
improvement, I do not mean to suggest anything having to do with course
selection or substantive course content. Rather, I am referring to the
negatively reinforcing law school learning environment imposed on stu-
dents of color by their professors, majority peers, and school administra-
tors.
The best hope for both a long- and short-term solution lies in what
Professor Claude Steele describes as “wise schooling.”357 The essential
characteristic of wise schooling is a commitment by faculty and adminis-
trators to communicate to minority students that they “see value and
promise in [them] and to act accordingly.”358 In sum:
The wisdom of these tactics is their subtext message: “You are valued
in this program because of your academic potential—regardless of your
current skill level. You have no more to fear than the next person, and
since the work is difficult, success is a credit to your ability, and a set-
back is a reflection only of the challenge.” The black students’ double
vulnerability around failure—the fear that they lack ability, and the
dread that they will be devalued—is thus reduced. They can relax and
achieve.359
The keys to wise schooling are assuring, valuing, challenging, and in-
spiring students. By assuring minority students that they will not suffer a
negative blow to their sense of self-worth and self-identity, they are
thereby encouraged to risk failure and expend maximum effort. By being
valued, the students understand that there are no negative assumptions
                                                                                                         
357. Claude M. Steele, Race and the Schooling of Black Americans, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 1992, at 68, 75  (observing that “[w]ise schooling may indeed be the missing
key to the schoolhouse door”).
358. Id. at 75.
359. Id. The author illustrates the success of this approach with a comparison to the movie
Stand and Deliver, which tells the story of Jaime Escalante, a math teacher who utilized a
similar technique of “assurance and challenge” to teach inner city kids at an East Los Angeles
Chicano school to master calculus and ultimately to “ace” the state math exams. Similarly, in
describing the unparalleled success experienced by Xavier University in producing record
numbers of black medical students, a spokesman said, “What doesn’t work is saying, ‘You
need remedial work.’ What does work is saying, ‘You may be somewhat behind at this time
but you’re a talented person. We’re going to help you to advance at an accelerated rate.’ ” Id.
at 75-76.
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about their intellectual capacity and ability to learn. As a consequence,
minority students are willing to engage in the learning process, confident
that they are capable of learning, and, more importantly, confident that
they are perceived by the authority figures around them as being capable.
When instructors challenge their students to meet high standards and
expend maximum effort, minority students understand that their instructors
have confidence in their potential to reach those goals. And, even if they are
unsuccessful in reaching them, “[f]rustration will be less crippling than al-
ienation.”360 Inspired students will be willing to strive repeatedly for excel-
lence when they are encouraged to recognize such failures as temporary
setbacks, not total defeats. The students will not so easily take failure as a
                                                                                                         
360. Id. at 78. The author observes that “[h]ere psychology is everything: remediation de-
feats, challenge strengthens—affirming their potential, crediting them with their achievements,
inspiring them.” Id.
A striking example of the power of such psychological factors was highlighted in a recent
New York Times article on the work of Professor Steele, who is a professor of sociology at
Stanford. See Ethan Watters, Claude Steele Has Scores To Settle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 45, 45-46. In describing experiments that Professor Steele had conducted,
the author observed that
Steele . . . has a different take [than other scholars on why African-Americans score
significantly worse on standardized tests the whites]. While they have tried to find an
answer to the black-white testing gap by analyzing factors like economic status, fam-
ily structure and educational opportunities, Steele has looked into the test-taking
situation itself and has found new evidence of “a beast” stalking black test takers.
“Our idea,” Steele says to the group, “was that whenever black students concen-
trate on an explicitly scholastic task, they risk confirming their group’s negative
stereotype. This extra burden, in situations with certain characteristics can be enough
to drag down their performance. We call this burden stereotype vulnerability.”
In the first experiment Steele describes, he and Joshua Aronson from the Univer-
sity of Texas gave two groups of black and white Stanford undergraduates a test
composed of the most difficult verbal skills questions from the Graduate Record
Exam. Before the test, one group was told that the purpose of the exercise was only
to research “psychological factors involved in solving verbal problems,” while the
other group was told that the exam was “a genuine test of your verbal abilities and
limitations.”
“This is what we found,” Steele says, placing a transparency onto the overhead
projector. As the information in the bar charts sinks in, people sit up in their chairs.
There are several audible “hmmms,” a muffled “wow!” Then a professor at the back
of the room asks: “Did you give the groups the same test?”
Steele smiles and says, “Yes.” The question speaks to the startling nature of the re-
sults. As the graphs indicate, the blacks who thought they were simply solving
problems performed as well as the whites (who performed equally in both situa-
tions). However, the group of black students who labored under the belief that the
test could measure their intellectual potential performed significantly worse than all
the other students.
Steele’s idea of stereotype vulnerability is not that the student consciously or un-
consciously accepts the stereotype (as other social scientists have speculated), but
rather, as Steele says, that they have to contend with this whisper of inferiority at the
moment when their mental abilities are most taxed. In trying not to give credence to
the stereotype, Steele theorizes, the students may redouble their efforts only to work
too quickly or inefficiently.
Id.
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mandate on their personhood and a measure of their intelligence, but more
as a challenge. By eliminating the stigma that restrains the spirit to achieve,
minority students will be free to reach their true potential. If proof were
needed, the fact that “erasing stigma improves black achievement is perhaps
the strongest evidence that stigma is what depresses it in the first place.”361
While the concept of making the student feel valued may sound overly
simplistic, it is not easily accomplished. However, when it is, the results
can be truly outstanding. The difficulty in accomplishing this goal in the
law school culture lies in overcoming the entrenched, negative views of
minority achievement potential. In addition, it will require law schools to
place a great deal more emphasis on teaching than they currently place.
Only in this way will law professors be taught to do something that they
                                                                                                         
361. Steele, supra note 357, at 77. The author also observes that the power of wise
schooling is so great that it can even overcome “the barriers of poverty.” Id. at 76. In this
context, the author relates the story of James Comer, a child psychiatrist at Yale University,
who over a 15-year period,
transformed the two worst elementary schools in New Haven, Connecticut, into the
third and fifth best in the city’s thirty-three school system without any change in the
type of students—largely poor and black. His guiding belief is that learning requires a
strongly accepting relationship between teacher and student . . . to establish a valuing
and optimistic atmosphere in which a child can—to use his term—identify with learning.
Id.
Recently, results of the implementation of Steele’s wise schooling at the college level were
released. The 21st Century Program, established at the University of Michigan in 1991, was
designed to counteract “stereotype vulnerability.” See Marilyn Elias, “Inoculating” Minority
Students Against Prejudice, USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 1995, at D6; Joanne Jacobs, Affirmative
Treatment Enrichment, THE SACRAMENTO BEE, June 28, 1995, at B7. Each year, the program
takes approximately 250 freshman (5% of the incoming class) and enrolls them in demanding
academic seminars and special study groups. See Elias, supra; Connie Leslie, You Can’t High-
Jump if the Bar Is Set Low: A New Prescription To Help Black Kids Succeed, NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 82, 82. The group of students, which includes whites and economically dis-
advantaged minority students, is selected at random and housed in the same dorm. Leslie, su-
pra. The students are told that they are going to be held to high standards but that they are ca-
pable of succeeding. Id. The workshops they attend demand a mastery of their courses beyond
the normal requirements and emphasize collaboration on projects. Elias, supra. The results are
dramatic.
Outside of the 21st Century Program, black freshmen have a 1.98 grade point average
(GPA), while whites have a 2.86. Jacobs, supra. Within the program, blacks average a 2.89
GPA, and whites do about one-tenth of a point better. Id. Not only do blacks who participate
in the program get higher grades, but their dropout rate plummets from 30% to 10%. Elias,
supra. The cost of the program? About $150 per student. Jacobs, supra. Based on these re-
sults, officials at the University of Michigan have announced plans to expand the program to
include 25% of incoming freshmen. Elias, supra.
790 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:721
now know very little about—how to teach.362 Teaching, after all, is what
law students and their prospective employers expect.363
Ironically, there is little or no effort made in law schools to train law
professors how to teach effectively.364 With little or no direction or training
in how to teach, law professors do the only thing they can—that is, they
teach as they were taught. In so doing, they also “teach what [they] have
lived.”365 As a consequence, law professors not only devise their own
methods of teaching out of virtually whole cloth, but they also imbue that
method with a value system that is socially, economically, politically, and
philosophically a product of their own lives and experiences. Many stu-
dents who do not share the professor’s socioeconomic class experiences of
the world are left out of this value system and either never break in or
suffer a “painfully long adjustment period.”366
Whether law schools, and law professors in particular, are willing to
undergo such a fundamental change in the way they value teaching is an
open question. However, whether such wise schooling can be effective in
creating more productive and successful students, and ultimately in re-
solving the problem of racially disparate bar performance, is almost be-
yond doubt. In the law school where I teach, Touro Law Center, we have
developed a nonstigmatizing minority support program that is based on
the wise schooling model. The first minority class to complete three years
in this program and take the bar examination passed on the first attempt at
a rate of eighty-five percent. This class had a greater than twenty percent
increase in passage rate over the class before it, and the passage rate dif-
fered insignificantly from that of the majority students in the class.367
                                                                                                         
362. See Vaughns, supra note 3, at 429. The author notes that “[a]s legal educators, law
faculty are, in fact novices. Although law professors are well adept at ‘inundating students with
substantive and procedural rules of law, [they] rarely if ever provide any guidance or instruc-
tions in methods of learning.’ ” Id. (quoting Paul T. Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law
Students, 52 ALB. L. REV. 471, 471 (1988)); see also Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Peda-
gogy and Politics, 73 GEO. L.J. 875, 882 (1985).
363. See Douglas D. McFarland, Students and Practicing Lawyers Identify the Ideal Law
Professor, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 93 (1986). McFarland found that there was a striking difference
between students’ concept of an ideal professor and how law teachers viewed themselves.
Whereas law professors positively valued research and writing, students and lawyers rejected
these priorities in favor of concentration on classroom instruction. See id. at 103.
364. I recall with amusement and surprise my own entry into academics on the raised side
of the lectern. In essence, the administration and faculty said, “Here is your class roster of
students and schedule of when the class meets, there is your classroom, good luck and good
bye!” I am sure that every law professor has had a similar initiation into the mysteries of law
teaching.
365. Rachel F. Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a Society of One, 20
U.S.F. L. REV. 503, 511 (1986).
366. Espinoza, supra note 338, at 292.
367. Moreover, it is interesting to note that in the current first-year class, the top-ranked
person is a minority student who was a very active participant in our program. In addition, two
other members of the program received the American Jurisprudence Awards for the best exam
performance in two different first-year classes.
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Based on this experience, we have every reason to expect this trend to
continue.
VII.   CONCLUSION
The problem of disparate bar performance along racial lines is very
troubling and has only in relatively recent years begun to receive the type
of serious attention and study that it deserves. The recently instituted
LSAC bar study will accomplish much toward the goal of providing im-
portant insights into the true nature and extent of this problem.
However, even the LSAC bar study is inadequate for the task. What is
needed is the compilation of comprehensive and ongoing data regarding
bar exam candidates and their test results. This can be accomplished only
if each state removes the current prohibitions on collecting race and gen-
der data on bar candidates. Perhaps national legislation on this issue is
needed in order to ensure uniformity across jurisdictions. But whether
instituted on a state by state, or a national, basis, such data is essential to
maintaining public faith in the fairness and meaningfulness of the bar
exam.
The evidence appears to suggest some measure of widespread, al-
though by no means universal, judicial hostility to bar examination chal-
lenges grounded on claims of racial bias. As a consequence, there is a
substantially accumulated weight of judicial authority against the pros-
pects of success for such suits. Viewed through this lens, the prospects
for future race-based judicial challenges to the bar exam do not appear to
be particularly bright. However, there are at least some rays of light that
could inspire future plaintiffs and guide future courts having occasion to
consider these issues.
The decision in Sharif v. New York State Education Department368
provides a well-reasoned basis upon which a new generation of judges
                                                                                                         
It is not surprising that until quite recently, our law school had five minority law professors
on the faculty, two of whom were women and both of whom were tenured. As a result of
leaves of absence and acceptance of visiting professor positions at other law schools, we now
have only three minority law professors. Interestingly, for the past two years in a row, the
president and vice-president of the student bar association have also been minority students.
Quite recently, the editor-in-chief of the law review was a minority student and a very active
member of our support program as a student and later as a teaching assistant. Last year, two
students from our law school were selected to be clerks in the New York Court of Appeals.
Both of these students were minorities and had been extremely active members of our support
program as first-year students and later as teaching assistants. One of those students was an
editor on the law review, and both were graduated in the top 10% of their class. Clearly, as
suggested earlier, there appears to be a definite correlation between the presence of minority
faculty members and the success of minority students.
Most importantly, we have a dean and an administration who fully support and fund our aca-
demic support program and participate in an ongoing and critical evaluation of our progress,
our needs, and our performance. Finally, a survey of the program’s graduates reveals that they
perceive that it has truly made a difference in their educational success.
368. 709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see supra part III.B.5.
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could revisit the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause and Title IX of the Education Amendments to protect racial mi-
norities and women from the irrational and inequitable reliance on stan-
dardized tests. The decision in Woodard v. Virginia Board of Bar Exam-
iners369 is also encouraging in view of its finding that, as agents of the
state, boards of bar examiners are “employers” within the jurisdictional
grasp of Title VII. Although, based on its sense of countervailing federal-
ism concerns, that court declined to extend Title VII’s test validation
standards to the bar exam, it provided a well-reasoned position on the ap-
propriate reach of the statute.370 As such, it could provide a firm intellec-
tual foundation upon which to build future cases that would urge that the
state be held to the same standards as any ordinary business or trade un-
ion, in being precluded from limiting minorities access to employment
under the guise of unrelated and irrational testing procedures.
In addition, it also is becoming quite evident to some that the bar exami-
nation is not a legitimate test of a student’s ability to practice law compe-
tently, but, rather, nothing more than a law school synthesizing experience,
more akin to a law school comprehensive examination than a professional
entrance examination.371 Some feel that the bar exam does not successfully
ensure professional competence and that it statistically, and unfairly,
screens out more qualified than unqualified applicants. Too much is at
stake for both the bar examination candidate and the public to allow this
to continue.372 As an alternative, some have called for a new, invigorated
look into the process of licensing lawyers, in order more accurately to en-
sure competence, without sacrificing fairness.
The process of revision of the bar examination will take time to com-
plete. In the meantime, the proper focus lies in concentrating not only on
the quality of the candidates that sit for the bar exam, but also on the law
school educational environment that produces those candidates. Nega-
tively reinforcing law school environments that damage the self-esteem of
minorities and women and cause them to disengage and become alienated
from the classroom and the law school environment can have severe and
damaging effects on the most vulnerable students—effects the significance
and duration of which are probably impossible to measure accurately.
This damage can, and often does, manifest itself in lower academic per-
formance during law school, as well as in self-fulfilling expectations of
failure on the bar exam. There is no pedagogical or structural reason for
any law school to maintain such environments, especially when viewed in
terms of the enormous, and clearly unintended, costs that they impose on
our students. As legal educators, we owe our students more, and we have
                                                                                                         
369. 420 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff’d, 598 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1979).
370. See supra part III.B.5.b.
371. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
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a moral obligation to lift these institutional and structural barriers to ex-
cellence without delay.
Minorities have been underrepresented in the law for a very long time.
One of many consequences of this exclusion has been to deprive minority
communities of fair access to the legal process and to competent, afford-
able legal representation. An enlightened society cannot afford to shut so
many people out of one of its most fundamental processes. The mark of
oppression that has characterized race and gender in our society since its
founding can no longer be allowed to exclude otherwise competent law
students from full and fair participation in the legal process. Such exclu-
sion is simply an unnecessary and counterproductive waste of valuable
human capital. In our current competitive global economy, we waste our
precious human resources at our peril.
There are effective and productive models upon which the nation’s law
schools should structure educational reform. The wise schooling approach
offers potentially tremendous, positive results at very little cost. Should
law schools and bar examiners truly embrace structural reform, or should
law professors resolve to cease being part of the problem and affirma-
tively seek ways individually to contribute to the solution, the results
could yield enormous benefits to the law school environment, to society in
general, and to the individual students who entrust their futures and their
psyches to us. On the eve of the twenty-first century and in an increas-
ingly diverse world, the costs of maintaining the current legal teaching
and licensing paradigms are too high. Should the system remain un-
changed, a generation of qualified, idealistic minority and women law
students will be marginalized and excluded by teaching and licensing
traditions that not only fail to ensure competence, but also sacrifice fair-
ness in the process.
